

SOCIAL RESEARCH

AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY
OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

Politics and Justice	<i>Otto Kirchheimer</i>	377
Backward Economies: The Problem of Partial Development	<i>Felicia J. Deyrup</i>	399
The Religion of Progress in America, 1890-1914	<i>David W. Noble</i>	417
Groups in Alexandria, Egypt	<i>Mona Sedky</i>	441
Heidegger's New Conception of Philosophy—The Second Phase of "Existentialism"	<i>Werner Marx</i>	451
Book Reviews		475
Table of Contents and Indexes for Volume 22	<i>after page</i>	494

WINTER • 1955

VOLUME TWENTY-TWO

NUMBER FOUR



Social Research

AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY
OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

EDITORIAL BOARD

FELICIA J. DEYRUP	ADOLPH LOWE
MARY HENLE	CARL MAYER
ERICH HULA	HANS NEISSER
ALVIN JOHNSON	SAUL K. PADOVER
HANS JONAS	ALFRED SCHUTZ
WILL LISSNER	HOWARD B. WHITE

EDITORIAL AND GENERAL OFFICE

66 West Twelfth Street, New York 11, N. Y.

Dr. Alvin Johnson, Editor

Elizabeth Todd, Managing Editor

Dr. Felicia J. Deyrup, Book Review Editor

Irene Sharick, Editorial Secretary

SUBSCRIPTION: \$5.00 a year for United States and Canada,

\$5.50 a year for other countries

SINGLE COPIES (exclusive of postage): \$1.50

SOCIAL RESEARCH is published in Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter issues, appearing in April, July, October, and January, by the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research, in cooperation with the Research Division of the New School. All correspondence concerning manuscripts should be addressed to Dr. Alvin Johnson.

January 1956

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

OTTO KIRCHHEIMER is Professor of Political Science in the Graduate Faculty of the New School.

FELICIA J. DEYRUP is Assistant Professor of Economics in the Graduate Faculty of the New School.

DAVID W. NOBLE, Assistant Professor in the History Department, University of Minnesota, has written numerous articles for professional periodicals on progressive thought in the United States.

MONA SEDKY, a graduate of the University of California, is Dean of the Higher Institute of Social Service, Alexandria, and a Technical Advisor for Industrial Welfare. She has also served on various government committees in Egypt.

WERNER MARX is Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Graduate Faculty of the New School.

Indexes of SOCIAL RESEARCH are published annually in the Winter issue; the contents are also indexed in the INTERNATIONAL INDEX TO PERIODICALS and the PUBLIC AFFAIRS INFORMATION SERVICE, available in most libraries. Microfilm copies of complete volumes of SOCIAL RESEARCH are available to regular subscribers, and can be purchased from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

SOCIAL RESEARCH is published quarterly at 374 Broadway, Albany 7, N. Y., for the New School for Social Research. All rights reserved. Contributions to SOCIAL RESEARCH may not be reprinted without the permission of the editors. Subscriptions, \$5.00 a year for United States and Canada, \$5.50 a year for other countries; single copies \$1.50. Entered as second-class matter June 13, 1944, at the post office at Albany, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Copyright, 1956, New School for Social Research, 66 West Twelfth Street, New York 11, N. Y.

POLITICS AND JUSTICE

BY OTTO KIRCHHEIMER

L'équilibre seule anéantit la force. Si on sait par où la société est déséquilibrée, il faut faire ce qu'on peut pour ajouter du poids dans le plateau trop léger. Quoique le poids soit le mal, en le maniant dans cette intention, peut-être ne se souille-t-on pas. Mais il faut avoir conçu l'équilibre et être toujours prêt à changer de côté comme la justice "ce fugitive du camp des vainqueurs."

Simone Weil, *La pesanteur et la grâce*

POLITICAL justice is the utilization of judicial proceedings for political ends. The political end, thus pursued, may be revolutionary or conservative, necessary from the community viewpoint or frivolous. It is not its legitimacy or illegitimacy with which we deal here, but only that it is pursued via the judicial process.

I

There is an intrinsic contradiction between the judicial means and the political goal. Political action is directed toward changing or confirming power relations; the apparatus of justice serves to resolve limited conflicts between individuals and the community, or between individuals, according to preordained community rules. Whatever attempts are made at settling power relationships, the very nature of power defies limitation, calculability, and permanent obedience. Justice, in its business of individualizing community values, is intended to create and reenforce an attitude of obedience toward them. These are basic cleavages to be kept in mind.

To be sure, there are several legitimate links between politics and justice. The first of these lies in the power of the policy-maker to change the established rules of the community, and

thus—by redefining the nature of substantive law—also to revise the goals of justice. Yet, whether such a change be undertaken via the long and arduous processes of orderly constitutional and legislative change, or pursued via the familiar expedients of emergency legislation operating in constitutional twilight zones, or instituted by outright communist or fascist methods, the objective goals of justice may to some extent be protected by the procedural safeguards. The momentum of a political credo may be half the story of its success; but the opportunity of justice to realize its aims in the face of impetuous demands for change clothed in the forms of law hinges largely on strict observance of the traditional rules of procedure.

A second link between the political authority and the legal apparatus lies in the fact that the judiciary does not initiate its own procedures; they are set in motion through the action of private individuals or through organs of the state—under the direct authority of the holders of political power, or at least in continuous association with them. Thus the decision to initiate action or to refrain from doing so, in short the responsibility for the selection of cases, rests largely with the political authority.

Finally, justice is linked to politics by the circumstance that magistrates are chosen through the machinery of political authority, whether directly by the people, by their legislative or governmental representatives, or by some compromise between the principles of cooptation and political appointment. Yet the judiciary, once chosen, is reasonably shielded in most moderate political climates against demands and temptations originating with the political authority—shielded by the rules of the fraternity, esprit de corps, the provisions of judicial establishment, and a modicum of economic security. None of these delicate mechanisms of protection is foolproof per se, and each undergoes its own stresses; but unless the social and political configuration as a whole undergoes swift change, the totality of these safeguards is not likely to be undermined or perverted.

In view of these considerations it might be alleged that the

concept of political justice is a misnomer, that it should be rejected not only because it lacks terminological compatibility but also because the cumulative safeguards against political perversion of justice work strongly against the proposition, even as a working hypothesis, that political justice is a phenomenon worthy of particular study. The term would thus be reserved for the characterization of practices of extremist regimes, or for limited revolutionary and emergency periods of constitutional regimes. But although restriction of the term political justice to the practices of totalitarian regimes may well be justified for propagandistic purposes, it begs more questions than it is able to answer.

It is true that the difference between political justice under constitutional and totalitarian regimes may be indicated by the degree of effectiveness of the safeguards already mentioned. This fact, however, is not sufficient proof that no problem of political justice exists under non-totalitarian regimes. On the contrary, since World War I political justice has almost everywhere been utilized to an increasing extent. It is all-pervasive in the history and practice of Communism, and takes a large place in the annals of National Socialism. It was a constant element in the history of the Weimar Republic, and forms an integral part of French political experience. It has come to play an increasing role in shaping political reality in the United States. Of the major powers, only Great Britain has kept its role at a minimum.

The distinction between the totalitarian and the non-totalitarian practice of political justice is not exclusively a matter of frequency and severity. It also lies in the fact that it is impossible for a democratic government to calculate in advance the outcome of a criminal prosecution. Such a government cannot prevent the defendant from introducing evidence, nor does it control or manipulate the judge or the jury in order to obtain desirable results. But if the exercise of political justice under non-totalitarian conditions is subject to greater risks, it also may bring more glittering rewards to its practitioners. Under totalitarian conditions there are many alternatives, equally efficient, for combat-

ing political deviations and implanting desirable ideologies; a constitutional regime's alternatives for obtaining such results are more restricted, and the decision of an independent court ranks high as an effective means for disposing of political adversaries and for instilling desirable political credos.

This dual purpose of political justice must be kept in mind. It aims not only at eliminating political adversaries from the political arena. The psychological effect of the proceedings on the population is also a large consideration. A picture of political reality is created in which the defendant incarnates socially undesirable tendencies. Under totalitarian conditions the machinery for these purposes remains exclusively in the hands of the official powerholders. Only the government of the day can use charges of treason, sedition, incitement to disobedience, for the purpose of eliminating enemies and impressing the population. Under democratic conditions, however, the adversaries of the present government may try, though in a somewhat more limited way, to work via the judicial apparatus. By provoking libel suits and starting the spadework for perjury charges they may try to change popular concepts of political reality as a condition precedent for dislodging the present powerholders.

Thus we cannot escape the reality of political justice. But neither can we, like former generations, salve our conscience by neatly separating legal duty from moral judgment. In the halcyon days of receding absolutism, of constitutional monarchies and liberal democratic regimes, this end was served by according a certain measure of privilege to the political offender. There was then an inclination to admit the sincerity of the political offender's motives while upholding the necessity of protecting society from his attempts at subversion. Much thought was given to the problem of how the necessity of defending the established order could be harmonized with recognition of its historical relativity and respect for the defendant's ill-guided but well-intentioned claims.

In purely criminological terms this special consideration shown to a political offender could be justified by pointing out that after

all he fitted into none of the customary cubbyholes. Retribution, improvement, and deterrence were equally inapplicable to his case when the only ultimate aim was the protection of society without destruction of the offender's moral integrity. As we have learned from Hegel (*Philosophy of Law*, #100), the average criminal in his very act of breaking the laws of society implicitly recognizes their validity. But the political offender opposes his own order and its system of moral values, to which he has sworn allegiance, to the one that is officially recognized.

The image of the political offender as an individual standing in resolute opposition to the existing society, and entitled to a certain consideration, spread most effectively when knowledge of possible alternative regimes, a concept of the community of the future, was still in the discussion stage. Thus before the turn of the twentieth century Lombroso could characterize the political offender by his inclination to push political progress too rapidly and tempestuously, thereby offending natural tendencies toward inertia.¹ But Russian, Italian, and German experience during the '20s and '30s and '40s seems to indicate that alternative political regimes are in our age characterized less by a dispute over the rate of speed of social and political progress than by a different concept of the dignity of the individual. The voluntary groupings of early socialist and anarchist days have given way to human robots in the service of a highly centralized political machine, carrying through bureaucratic orders as part of their political and, as may be, terroristic employment relation.

It is doubtful to what extent the older concept of political offender remains practicable under such conditions. Moreover, a number of special factors have put the operative value of the concept in doubt. We have seen that when a country was in a situation of acute political conflict its judiciary could not be relied upon to accord the privileges of the political offender indiscriminately to all enemies of the existing order, but only to those with whose motives it felt some sympathy. More-

¹ Lombroso and Laschi, *Il delitto politico e le rivoluzioni* (Turin 1890) p. 428.

over, what had started as a means of enforcing the law while making desirable moral differentiations became an instrument of pressure in groups hostile to the public order; they utilized the very possibility of special consideration for political offenders as a further means of massive pressure against the state apparatus.

All this restricted from the outset the privileges accorded to a political offender under the conditions of unstable societies. And more homogeneous societies, like the United States, became unwilling to recognize the inherent premise of the relativity of their political order. Their judicial personnel, as well as their average citizens, including members of parole boards, could not help viewing the political offender as something worse than the average criminal; the concept of the heretic does not take softer contours by becoming thoroughly secularized.

Thus the attempts of a more liberal age to protect the existing order without necessarily casting moral aspersions upon its enemies have been superseded in another climate of opinion and action. These attempts, however we evaluate them—as magnanimous, utopian, foolish, or socially harmful—are becoming an echo of bygone days. Limitation of the area of political justice must be sought by other methods. And to find these methods we should consider more closely the nature of political justice itself.

II

There are four levels on which political justice may operate.

On the first level it is inextricably mingled with elements of ordinary criminal cases, and only the personality or the motive of the offender suggests a political element. Murder remains murder, even when committed by a member of an impotent minority bent on taking revenge and calling attention to oppression. Stealing atomic secrets in order to transmit them to the authorities of another country remains a crime, even if the perpetrator thinks that the ensuing military strengthening of the preferred country offers better guarantees for the welfare of mankind than the continuing atomic monopoly of his own country.

Faced with such issues the prosecuting authorities will try to minimize the political elements of the case, whereas the defendant and his sympathizers will make the most of them. If the defendant admits the facts as charged, he will attempt, at least under non-totalitarian conditions, to publicize his own political motivations. The defendant will be most successful, at least propagandawise, if he can show that his government has displayed a singular zeal in singling out for prosecution persons who think as he does, or belong to a group he represents—as for instance Catholic circles have done in regard to both Nazi and Communist attempts to implicate members of their clergy in violations of currency regulations. Where the prosecution of criminal cases in this category is indeed politically selective, the moral validity of the proceedings is obviously impaired.

The second level on which political justice may operate is found when the defendant has tried to undertake a direct attack on the established constitutional order. Treason and sedition may occur without reference to forces outside the national state. But from Alcibiades' day to our own, revolutionary onslaughts and foreign attempts to subvert the constitutional order have often gone hand in hand. In a world that is daily becoming more closely integrated, treason, political relations with the enemy, and high treason—never legally separated in Anglo-Saxon thinking—are becoming well-nigh synonymous. Needless to say, this is only a description of an abstract situation. In each individual instance it is all-important to determine whether the defendant acted on foreign orders, and as part of a foreign organization, or whether there was only an effort to bolster independent political action by evoking parallel foreign intervention.

The interstitial zone that separates treason and sedition from opposition within the constitutional framework provides abundant examples of the third level of political justice, which therefore is best discussed in connection with treason and sedition. This level embraces the whole gamut of what we might call omnibus political prosecutions. Appearing under a variety of forms, they

have in common a lack of definite action which would turn dangerous ideas, propaganda, discussions, incipient organizational forms, common elaboration of doctrinal platforms, and consequent indoctrination into something akin to concrete moves directed toward the overthrow of the constitutional order.

From the viewpoint of a full-fledged constitutional order of the traditional liberal type, the difference between the second and the third level is, at least theoretically, plain. On the second level the prosecution can follow definitely ascertainable patterns of political action, but on the third—the twilight zone between prevention of future revolutionary action and violation of free-speech-and-assembly guarantees—there is an effort to advance the defense line of the established order. In doing so every act of prosecution is faced with an intricate set of appraisals: given the defendant's antecedents, his doctrinal background and assertions, the tendencies and loyalties of the group of which he is a part, what, the prosecution asks, would he do in a situation that might give him an opportunity to develop a large amount of initiative unhampered by any effective deterrents? In other words, the prosecution, before making any legal moves, attempts to determine the defendant's actions in a hypothetical set of circumstances.

We know, of course, from the experience of recent years that an established constitutional regime may altogether exclude some group from operating in its midst. Logically it then dispenses with concrete proof of potential harm, substituting an en bloc legislative judgment as to the dangerous character of the group, with the intention of binding all administrative and judicial agencies to that judgment, as if it were a judicially established fact. Whether such legislative creation of something akin to the crime of *lèse majesté* involves a drastic curtailment of political freedom depends more on the social and political atmosphere of the given society than on the harshness of such exclusionary statutes. But in any event this approach toward cases of the third-level type still constitutes the exception rather than the rule under constitutional regimes.

In a totalitarian regime, on the other hand, an official who is faced with such cases will usually choose between two procedures. Since the organization, and to some extent even the utterance, of a deviating political opinion is excluded a priori by the conditions of the totalitarian establishment, the violator may be grabbed and handled without benefit of trial, by simple administrative procedure. But if public proceedings are indicated, whether for political or for propaganda reasons, the cases of the third level are invariably handled as if they implied sedition or treason.

Such a shift from the third to the second level is easier, of course, if the defendant has made some ascertainable, if only slight, preparations in the direction of the hypothetical circumstances. This is what seems to have happened, for example, to Cardinal Mindszenty, who, with other persons, discussed—and was careless enough to keep some documentary evidence—what steps might be taken if a *vacuum juris* were to arise, that is, if during a third world war, through circumstances beyond his power, his oppressors, the present Hungarian rulers, were overthrown.² But usually the task of projecting deviationist doctrine and presuming future action on the basis of past behavior involves more elaborate chores if, and this seems important, such charges are supposed to be taken at face value by the public at large.

This task requires what I would call prefabrication of an alternative reality. The prosecution must outline a concrete situation, blending elements of a universally known existing situation with fictitious happenings into projections of a dire future. The result is both prefabricated and alternative. It is prefabricated because its main elements have to be developed before the trial stage, as otherwise its various pieces might not fit into the total picture that the prosecution wants to create. Therefore the defendant and the prosecution must have agreed on the main theme, at least in its main outline—be it collusion between Rajk and Tito for the overthrow of the Hungarian regime in 1948,³ or

² See *The Trial of Jozsef Mindszenty* (Budapest 1949) pp. 75, 76, 112-14.

³ *Laszlo Rajk und Komplizen vor dem Volksgericht* (Berlin 1949).

the reestablishment of capitalism and the undermining of the Soviet regime by organizing sabotage and terrorist and diversionist acts on orders of Trotsky, as in the trial of the so-called Trotskyite center in 1936.⁴ And the prosecution's case represents an alternative reality because the trial is conducted with a view to showing that the accused, but for the official action, would have had a good chance of success in carrying through his program. The element of alternativity necessitates a large amount of concrete substantiation, for the public must be directed toward accepting a dramatic channeling of all future contingencies into a battle between the present policies and the criminal alternatives identified with and pinned on the defendant.

Contrary to some beliefs, only a certain measure of collaboration from the defendant, not his full admission of everything charged, is necessary in order to fulfill the requirement that the prefabricated reality be concretely substantiated. Thus, for example, many important defendants in the Russian trials of the 1930s,⁵ as well as Kostov in the postwar Bulgarian trial,⁶ admitted their intentions of doing away with the existing regime yet stoutly denied espionage, drawing a sharp line distinguishing freely admitted sabotage, subversion, and general opposition from only very incompletely admitted political relations with the enemy. Such partial cooperation with the prosecution may be proffered for any number of reasons. Continued identification of the defendant with his party may cause him to accept the distortion of facts as a means of reaching the party's aims, through dramatizing the external dangers and the mistaken strategy of the opposition. The defendant may also desire to utilize the only channel available to explain his stand before a wider audience, even if only in a devious and mutilated form.

⁴ *Traitors on Trial*, a verbatim report on the case of the anti-Soviet bloc of rightists and Trotskyites (Moscow 1938).

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 432—Bukharin: "I never considered myself a spy, nor do I now"; Vishinsky: "It would have been more correct if you did"; Bukharin: "That is your opinion, but mine is different."

⁶ See *Traitscho Kostoff und seine Gruppe* (Berlin 1951) pp. 76-77, 639, 653.

Nevertheless, in the cases mentioned above the defendants' admissions allowed the prosecution to construe—from actual activities of former periods, interpreted in the light of the existing situation, and from the concretization of projected plans—a picture of what would have happened if the defendant had been victorious. In order to obtain this alternative reality the proceedings followed what has been called "rules of translation."⁷ Under the defendants' sometimes willing, sometimes grudging cooperation, certain of their thought and discussion patterns were translated into the realm of action, and they were debited with the hypothetical consequences of these nonexistent actions. Thus Vishinsky in his prosecutions led his victims close to admitting that foreseeing certain contingencies is tantamount to supporting their coming into operation. In doing so he took the defendants through the remotest possible consequences flowing from what he made them admit to be their plans for political action, always trying—in order to create the concrete image of the defendants which the prosecution wished to impress on the public—to force on them interpretations in line with the prosecution's theory of how they would have acted in these hypothetical contingencies.

In obtaining this effect, prosecution policy was clearly more successful during the Russian prosecutions of the 1930s than in the satellite prosecutions of the '40s and '50s. It seems that the growing elimination of major intra-party policy controversies from public discussion, and consequently from the subject matter of the trial, and the concentration on characterizing the main defendants as spies and foreign agents have lessened the chances of creating something akin to a meaningful alternative reality. The low point seems to have been reached in the Slansky trials in 1952, where admissions were intentionally ambiguous because more often than not they concerned activities that were perfectly normal at the time they were undertaken.

Prefabrication of alternative reality did not play a major role

⁷ Nathan Leites and Elsa Bernaut, *Ritual of Liquidation: The Case of the Moscow Trials* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1954).

among the Nazis. For this there were two simple reasons: there was little discipline in their own ranks for upholding a party ideal in the face of serious factional dissension; and disloyalty among the politically conscious part of the population was ever so omnipresent that fabrication was unnecessary.

It is obvious that under non-totalitarian conditions no such cooperation is obtainable from defendants. There is virtually no possibility of easily turning omnibus charges into treason and sedition trials. Only through the willing cooperation of the defendant, or through the presentation of evidence admissible under the standards of a Western type of court, is it possible to attain sufficient concretization for the creation of an alternative reality. Under such conditions experienced practitioners handling the prosecution of adherents of revolutionary organizations have never cared, in the absence of revolutionary action, to spell out the issue of the imminence of danger, preferring to reach a conviction on the basis of propaganda activities and doctrinal assertions. They have been satisfied with a stereotyped formula without feeling a need for elaborate discussion and justification.

In the United States this trend has been magnified in the shift from the "clear and present danger" formula, which would require some concrete justification in terms of the likely effect of group activities, to Learned Hand's "grave and probable" test, adopted with very slight variations by the majority of the Supreme Court in the Dennis case. Both the vigorous, if problematic, concurring opinion of Justice Jackson and the heart-searching and tortuous consent of Justice Frankfurter question the feasibility of spelling out the chances of communism.⁸

It would be difficult indeed to sort out, even retrospectively, the various causal strands in cases of past court action—and inaction. Would we agree with a recent historian about the significance, in the later misfortunes of the Weimar Republic, arising from the failure of the Munich People's Court and the Bavarian Minister of Justice to expel Hitler after the November putsch of

⁸ See 341 U.S. 494, 517, 570 (1951).

1923? Or, acting in reverse—and because we now know that after 1923 the pseudo-revolutionary slogans of the German Communist party only hid their patent unwillingness and inability to create a revolutionary situation—would we reproach the Reichsgericht for having continuously applied to the German Communists what we have now come to call the “grave and probable” test, and bundled them off to prison in droves?

Yet if neither prospective nor retrospective considerations provide a court with much of a guide in determining how to strike the balance between freedom and community protection, what else remains but remembering that decisions of this nature are as much, if not more, an outcome of the prevailing psychological and institutional structure as of a rational choice? Perhaps future courts will find help toward making a rational decision in trying to analyze why the British political system has not created the same pressure for preventive repression as has the present system in the United States. I do not say that the decisions will therefore necessarily be different, but courts may become more conscious of all the elements entering into their decisions.

However that may be, whenever and wherever there are in a society potentially dangerous elements whose very existence carries a threat to the continuation of the current regime—be it the opposition within the ranks of the Russian Communist party in the early 1930s, or the semi-legal residual source of opposition represented by the Catholic church in Communist Hungary, Poland, or Yugoslavia, or the Communist parties throughout the non-Communist world, serving as self-appointed heirs to any regimes of patent social and economic disequilibrium—wherever there are such elements, decisions have to be taken by the existing powerholders whether to live with, harass, or destroy these potential threats to their existence.

Whether the courts in non-totalitarian societies are better equipped or more influential in shaping these decisions than those in totalitarian countries remains an open question. We are not here discussing court participation under totalitarian con-

ditions, where courts play principally the role of auxiliaries of the prosecution, with interest concentrated and purpose directed exclusively on the propaganda effect of the trial, and with the main outline of judgment a foregone conclusion. To my mind the most precious thing about the courts' participation in such decisions in non-totalitarian societies is that they are participating at all.

This participation has the advantage that a decision for preventive repression on the basis of doctrine, association, or dangerous tendencies—level three of our classification, if you remember, rather than level two—can never be completely monolithic or fully coordinated. It is divided among different state organs, which may not respond in the same degree to the pressures of the moment. Moreover, court decisions may carry dissents—a now classic one is that of Justice Douglas in the Dennis case (pp. 494, 581)—and thus give the community the possibility of applying a legitimate yardstick to criticize its own actions. Apart from this there is another important advantage. Such decisions have to stand squarely on the need for preventive repression. The offender appears as exactly what he is: a potential danger to the present institutions, whose chances for survival depend on all the factors determining the history of the present generation, including the wisdom or foolishness of the policy of those in power, and not on lurid plots of murder, corruption, subversion, and espionage, perpetrated in our midst as prefabrications à la Vishinsky.

Communist states, as we have seen, have tried to create in their trials a perverted picture of alternative reality. Their indictments are formulated in terms sweeping enough to embrace the sum total of the defendant's career. The trial and the much less important skeleton-type judgments concretize and reinterpret this career as the prosecution envisages it, thus fabricating history for official use. With us, traditional procedural rules, the customs of the bench and bar, in short the sum total of our Western tradition, exclude such a course of action. Either we must find evidence of treason and sedition or we have to admit, shamefacedly or una-

bashed, openly preventive repression. Thus we never intentionally try to press the court to do the historian's job. According to standards of present-day Western society, it is the collective mind of the people which decides on the acceptability of an historical image. Our most effective political trials—which, however, were at the same time our most dubious—have demonstrated awareness of that fact.

Thus we arrive at the fourth and last level of political justice, comprising what may be called the artificially created political offense. This does not have its origin in the defendant's alleged intent to take away life or property, or to carry out real or imaginary assaults on the political order—attempts against which the state rushes in whenever they come to its attention. The offense on this fourth level is artificially created, dug out by the defendant's enemies, somewhere from the millions of facts that may be found in the files, depositions, and affidavits constituting the archives of contemporary government. From them the minute issue, the artifact, is distilled and prepared by counsel and pressed into the tight form of a libel or perjury suit. History seems to have been obliterated from the proceedings. The grandstand play becomes a thrilling detective story, with every member of the public invited to participate in the solution of the riddle, which is carefully reduced to simple true-false proportions.

Making a virtue out of procedural impediments and necessities, the proceedings minimize the usual front-page political stuff and concentrate instead on minute aspects of the defendant's past. These may or may not play a significant role in his career. They may or may not illuminate his character, acts, and desires. But once they have been chosen, dissected, prepared, and applied, the person who has been identified with them has to stand on them, affirm or deny them. They may concern the exact wording of a speech he gave on an occasion now long past; an isolated official act which formed only a segment in a whole chain of transactions; his membership in an organization that had meaning for him in bygone days; even the date of a long-ago dinner engagement.

At times, to be sure, these dredgings relate to a past that has a logical or necessary connection with the person's present situation or thought patterns, activities, hopes, and rejections; in a few cases the past patterns may be clearly related to an occurrence that remains important in the person's as well as the nation's life, and for technical reasons perjury or libel proceedings are considered the only means of evoking them before a court. Equally often, however, they remain isolated facts neither relevant to the individual's present life nor organically related to the public's legitimate concern. Produced by the legal technician, there they are, isolated from the time and circumstances that gave them meaning and purpose. Because of their apparent factuality they are easily understandable and reducible to the level of the detective story, with the contemporary public's conceptual apparatus furnishing the key to their interpretation.

It is not the jury or the court that makes the interpretation; the verdict of these bodies relates only to the narrow factual issue under scrutiny. Even during the trial, the carefully distilled artifact, the concrete issue, begins to disappear. The process of translation and transformation from fragmentary acts to a simplified picture of political reality has set in. It is a collective process, taking part simultaneously in millions of minds, and it is more intensive than the mere passive reception of the artificial reality prefabricated for the purposes of the totalitarian trial. Millions carry out a total identification of the Klieg-light-fixed episode with the political beliefs with which the defendant is presumably identified, though not charged.

In this process of collective translation from the isolated fact of yesteryear to the political reality of today, a sin of omission has been committed. Time, historical time, personal time, has been treated as if it were forever arrested. Accordingly, personal, historical, and collective meaning do not jibe. On the three other levels of political trials, defendants are at the same time victors and martyrs, sinners and criminals, and will remain so until history debunks or vindicates them. The hapless individual in the

artificial political trial will be kept in limbo, because more often than not there is no meaningful tie between the order of facts from which the legal technicians have distilled the artifact and the order of human purposes.

The collective translation, with all its spontaneity, is a blind alley if employed as a key to the interpretation of history. Libel suits and perjury proceedings, the penny-arcade access to the realm of history and justice, are more powerful in the making of history than the Communist prefab. Yet, though they may create history, they rarely reveal its secrets.

III

Can the political prosecution be de-politicized? Can the prosecutor be released from the orders and suggestions of politically responsible officers—attorneys general or ministers of justice? After all, so goes the argument, it is the prosecutor's job to enforce the law, and it should lie within his discretion to determine the circumstances in which the machinery of repression should be set in motion. His discretion should be exercised with a view to the availability of evidence and the dictates of public interest, rather than with a view to the desires of those in power.

Before dealing with this argument it is important to emphasize that the prosecutor in our day is only one of a multiplicity of repressive agencies. He has to take his place with those who take away jobs or, as the case may be, low-cost housing from political unreliaables, who cancel citizenship papers, reject passport applications, and refuse honorable discharges from the armed forces. Yet there has to be some coordination and some focal point in repression, even though it may sometimes seem that there is more competition in political repression than in any other line of business. And criminal prosecution, as a result of procedural guarantees and the assurance of fully adversary proceedings, is still the one method that sifts its material less with an eye toward the politically desirable than the legally attainable results.

The question is, then, whether political pressure becomes worse

because it is channeled through an office like that of the ministry of justice or the attorney general. Its centralization has at least the advantage of fixing political responsibility on somebody above the bureaucratic level. Moreover, to what degree does the prosecutor's responsiveness to pressures depend on his civil-service or bureaucratic status? Is the European district attorney, the model of the old-fashioned ideal of status and *esprit de corps* and a conscious representative of what he himself likes to call the most objective office in the world, less impervious to pressures than the attorney of the United States Department of Justice and the elected or politically appointed American district attorney? On the other hand, is the American go-getter at subversion, with his reputation dependent on the number of convictions obtained, preferable to his European colleague, whose peers judge him more according to the number of cases disposed of without complications and within a certain time limit?

In any case, whatever the advantages and disadvantages of a specific institutional setup, there is one point that should be firmly kept in mind: the sheer multiplication of required contacts with officialdom has skyrocketed the chances that criminal prosecution can be brought against any one of a vast number of persons, for what appears to most as technical violations of the law, if only the required amount of energy and money is available—with the statute of limitations and, in some countries though not in the United States, periodic amnesties forming only an incomplete bar against such undertakings. Thus the concept of universal guilt becomes almost a social reality, which is no less shocking because it becomes ever more morally meaningless. It is this wide and ever-increasing area of choice of possible criminal prosecutions, with the test of relevance and materiality inevitably judged by the political criteria of the day, which brings the prosecuting agencies forever into the danger zone of political justice.

Especially under the conditions of the Anglo-American legal system the judge plays a dual role in the administration of politi-

cal justice. He presides over the trial as an arbiter of contending claims, and sums it up for the jury. After the verdict he turns around and engages in the business of sentencing. I have often marvelled at how easily this transition from an umpire to an enforcement officer comes to most judges. The solution of the riddle seems to lie in the fact that the value structure embodied in the law enforced by the judge is not only his personal choice; what he expresses are the most cherished community values. This situation may change, however, if the political sovereign, manipulating law and administration alike, ceases to represent community values. Doctrines of the right to resistance have an odd habit of entering court opinions only under successor regimes.

As long as a complete estrangement persists between community values and the official public order, the judge must either obey that order or resign. Frequently, however, the community develops deep and lasting divisions as to the preferable scale of values. These divisions may have their origins in disputes over the forms of social, economic, or military organizations or over moral and religious systems; often the cleavages become so deep as to create formidable and composite total ideological structures. In the most auspicious circumstances judicial independence connotes impartiality in establishing the facts, or assisting the jury to establish them, and judging them according to the premises of the commonly agreed value structure. But in the absence of such common values the judge incurs the unavoidable danger of trying to create new community values by identifying his own predilections with the value structure of one segment of the community; in addition, he may become myopic in the establishment of the facts themselves. He is thus in danger of forfeiting on both counts his claim to obedience.

In the eyes of the defendant the situation will then arise which Socrates in Plato's *Gorgias* (522) describes as follows (Jowett translation): "I shall be tried just as a physician would be tried in a court of little boys at the indictment of the cook. What would he reply under such circumstances, if some one were

to accuse him, saying, 'O my boys, many evil things has this man done to you: he is the death of you, especially of the younger ones among you, cutting and burning and starving and suffocating you, until you know not what to do; he gives you the bitterest potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike the variety of meats and sweets on which I feasted you!' What do you suppose that the physician would be able to reply when he found himself in such a predicament? If he told the truth he could only say, 'All these evil things, my boys, I did for your health,' and then would there not just be a clamour among a jury like that? How they would cry out!"

Thus the absence of a commonly acknowledged value structure is the basis of the defendant's attitude in most political trials. I intentionally say most, not all, political trials. In a society with an almost universally acknowledged value structure, a defendant may deny all intention of disloyalty, completely submit to the accepted procedures, and with maximum energy try to prove that he has always kept within the society's bounds. This is the one configuration of a political trial where the established society will invariably triumph. Even if the prosecution loses its case, it has the satisfaction of seeing its rules and procedures acknowledged as just and legitimate. But the great majority of defendants in political trials are unwilling to undertake this act of total submission. Unlike Socrates at his own trial, they will not only deny the ideals for which the court stands, but negate its very authority.

Under such a configuration the defense strategy will be determined by purely technical motivations. If the defense has the better witnesses, and if the established procedures leave enough leeway for the defense to press for acquittal—or, what may be more important, to impugn, for propagandistic purposes, the methods of the investigation or the prosecution—then the defendant may be willing to acknowledge enough of the court's authority to carry out these objectives. But the primary object of the defendant is to maintain and if possible improve his status

in his own group. It is therefore the political needs of the group and not his private predilections which decide his attitude in the trial. The aim of his group will vary according to the political circumstances. It may vary from trying to establish the perfect legality of the group's actions—perhaps even taking the form of an offer of future cooperation with the established authorities under freely agreed terms—to professing its revolutionary fervor. But in the mind of a political defendant the exploitation of the court proceedings for the propaganda purposes of his group, and the public manifestation of his loyalty to the ideals of that group, remain uppermost. According to the yardstick of his group it is Dimitrov who established the perfect defense record, and Torgler who established the negative record, for he “perverted” a political into a criminal trial by accepting the very system and premises under which it was held. From the viewpoint of the established order the evaluation would obviously be exactly the opposite.

The same consideration determines the choice of a defense attorney. In his own methodical way Lenin, during the 1905 revolution, thought this problem through from the viewpoint of a revolutionary group.⁹ He started from the premise that a lawyer is bound to be a most reactionary and untrustworthy being who should be entirely restricted to collecting and criticizing evidence. In no circumstances should he be allowed to influence the political line of the defense, and especially he should not be permitted to make any statement that would detract from the full political or propagandistic effect of the attitude taken by the defendant in the interest of and in accord with the party. Little could Lenin foresee at that time that within a few decades there would be Communist lawyers working on both ends of the political spectrum.

In political trials in Communist courts the defense lawyer plays, indeed, not only a secondary but a pitiful role. He is

⁹ See his letter of January 19, 1905, to Helena Stassowa, reprinted in *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 7 (Paris 1928) p. 76.

allowed neither to organize nor to comment on evidence, tasks that are reserved to the defendant's terms of bargaining with the MVD and to the dictates of his revolutionary conscience, nor is the lawyer permitted to evaluate the trial as a whole in his summing up. When he appears at the very end of the proceedings he enters what may be considered, at best, a plea for mitigation derived from the personal circumstances of the defendant.

On the other hand, lawyers in the Western system of courts who share the political affiliation of the defendant are bound to become a problem to the court. They function essentially as middlemen between the defendant and his free associates, and as executors of a policy determined primarily by political goals rather than by traditional trial objectives. The degree of incompatibility between these trial-transcending goals and the objectives of the court may be sufficient to culminate in expulsion of the lawyer or in declaring him in contempt of court.

If this happens, one of the main dilemmas of political trials becomes readily apparent: clothing political repression in judicial forms protects the community from the grave danger that repression may become unlimited and ubiquitous; at the same time it surrounds repression with as much legitimacy as it can ever obtain while retaining some degree of effectiveness and calculability. To whittle down these advantages of orderly political repression constitutes a major objective of the political defendant and his lawyer. He may cry victory if the court itself helps him toward revising the meaning of the trial in the verdict of history.

Thus, unless the defendant totally submits to both the procedures and the value structure which the court represents, the prosecution will never be able to proclaim a complete victory in a political trial. Exercise of authority without consent may at times become inevitable. Yet this very configuration engenders the everlasting process of revision. Therefore if I were asked whether there is any rewarding feature in political justice, my answer would be what is at the same time the most serious reproach against it: that it forever lacks the element of finality.

BACKWARD ECONOMIES: THE PROBLEM OF PARTIAL DEVELOPMENT*

BY FELICIA J. DEYRUP

IN THE field of economic development of "backward" areas, so much of the effort of economists, diplomats, and technicians has of necessity centered on specific phenomena, and on practical means of changing or improving them, that there is considerable danger of certain general characteristics of the entire problem being neglected. Specialization in a single aspect of development—while essential if realistic proposals for improvement are to be made—may result in insufficient emphasis on other aspects. Nor is it always evident that experts in the field keep clearly in mind at all times the subtle yet powerful forces that shape and limit future development.

It seems therefore desirable to consider some of the overall problems of economic development, the nature of the economic growth that has resulted in the modern industrial capitalism of Western Europe and North America, the effect on underdeveloped countries of prior contact with economically advanced countries, the limitations of various methods of furthering development, and the prognosis for rapid and permanent economic change in the less advanced regions of the world.

I

While economists are well aware of the character of the economic growth which resulted in the industrialization of Western Europe, the United States, and Japan in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it is worth while to emphasize the cumulative, rather

* AUTHOR'S NOTE—I am deeply indebted to Dr. Adolph Lowe for his criticism of the first draft of this paper.

than the simply additive, quality of this process. Most economic indicators, such as national income, productive capacity, real wages, and the like, can reflect only the additive aspects of economic growth: national income rises by ten percent over a given period; steel production doubles; and so on. But fundamentally, economic development has been a cumulative process, like the differentiation of the physiological structures and systems of an animal from the single-celled stage to the adult animal, rather than an additive process, like the piling of bricks on one another in the building of a wall. Not to push the use of biological analogies too far, it nevertheless should be noted that the advanced economy is as profoundly different from the underdeveloped one as the highly developed animal is from a simple form—granted that in each case the functions essential to existence are carried out by the lower or less advanced form as well as by the higher form.

The histories of the economically advanced countries show that certain features, common to all of them, are dominant during the period of their rapid development. Most conspicuous are the following: an increased rate of capital formation and application of capital to new fields of investment; rapid invention and the introduction of the machine technique; a shift from small-scale production to large-scale production; a change in the structure of production, that is, in the relation of firms to one another within an industry; an increase in the size, both geographical and structural, of the markets for many types of goods; a shift in the nature of labor and in the bargaining position of the worker; an increase in the dynamic activity of the entrepreneur, resulting in the appearance of new industries as well as in new methods of production and distribution; an overall readjustment of political power among the different economic groups in society, a process that usually eventuates in increased centralization of government.

These factors in rapid economic development are by no means independent of one another. Not merely does each factor interact with the others, but each is, so to speak, one side of a polygonal coin of which the others are the other sides. Or, to put it perhaps

more accurately, each separate factor is one phase of every other factor, as well as an entity in its own right. Thus the development of the machine technique is the physical representation of accumulated capital, and therefore of capital formation. Since the machine technique in its advanced state is possible only where a large market exists, it is an image of that market; it is also a phase of large-scale production; it is clear evidence that vital changes have occurred in the position and character of labor, and that the entrepreneurial function is operating on a highly dynamic level. The changes wrought by the interplay of these factors effect changes in the structure and even the nature of government. And, since men are adaptable in their ideas and attitudes as well as in their actions, these changes affect the ideals and ethics of society, while being, in a sense, the embodiment of those ideals and ethics. For although there are dissident and minority ideals and ethics in every society, most conspicuously present in times of rapid change, the ways men earn their livings and enjoy the fruits of their labors are in general sanctioned by the value structures of their societies.

It is of course understandable that no specialist in economic development, or anyone else for that matter, can keep clearly before his eyes at all times the many aspects and dimensions of rapid change. The elaboration of practical methods to further change requires, in fact, that the student or policymaker concentrate on one aspect only, tracing it from its origins through its broadest ramifications. But this admittedly necessary specialization may go so far as serious atomization of the subject as a whole, taking the form of a temporary neglect of the fact that the nature of the developmental process is such that a marked change in one aspect of society cannot be permanently retained without corresponding changes in other aspects. This may mean either that the specialist finds his best solutions to the problem practically unworkable, or that specific efforts made along one line only are rapidly canceled out by the retarding influence of other forces. The net result is all too likely to be a sense of disillusionment and

frustration on the part of all those who are exponents of a particular approach to economic development.

II

There is no way in which the significance of the interdependence characterizing the various factors of economic development can be indicated more clearly than by a brief survey of the state of partial development that exists in almost all underdeveloped countries today. Economists in the field are, of course, fully aware of these conditions. But it is important that their existence be emphasized, for the directions of possible future change are definitely controlled and channeled by the fact that partial development has already occurred. For this reason, if for no other, reliance on a slavish copying of the steps by which more advanced countries have developed is pointless. The underdeveloped countries, because they are not *tabulae rasae* but have, so to speak, been set in their future course by partial development, can successfully proceed further only along certain lines of growth.

It may be argued that many of the generalizations here discussed are unrealistic—that the conditions of partial economic development set forth below exist only in certain instances, or are far from universally present in underdeveloped countries. Indeed, there is no denying that some countries, like India, even though not developed to their own satisfaction, are years or decades ahead of others, such as certain Middle Eastern countries. On the other hand, what appears to be of overwhelming significance is that, with a very few exceptions, all the underdeveloped countries of the world have long been in contact with the economically advanced countries, not merely in regard to the exchange of material goods but also in regard to the exchange of institutions, attitudes, and ideas.

The means of international communication, however imperfect they may have been, have yet served to make the vast majority of the peoples of the world aware of most of the benefits, and perhaps to a less extent of the limitations, of industrial capitalist society.

Very rarely has the direct experience of the economically backward countries been limited to contact with explorers or with occasional travelers from the advanced countries. Usually it has taken the form of intimate contact with some of the important physical institutions of capitalist society—the modern mine, railroad, oil installation, or estate for the production of exportable crops—as well as with major non-physical institutions, such as the capitalistic concepts of property and contract, the wage system, and so on. This contact, although it has not affected all underdeveloped countries equally, has nevertheless so vital a bearing on the nature of subsequent contacts between them and the advanced countries that it seems justifiable, despite the dangers of generalization, to analyze its separate characteristics as they affect, to a greater or less degree, every underdeveloped country.

The long continued contact of the underdeveloped countries with advanced countries means essentially that partial development has already occurred, bringing in its wake thoroughgoing alterations in the structure of society. In some ways these alterations repeat the patterns of the countries that industrialized in the nineteenth century. Thus the collapse of social institutions in underdeveloped countries today parallels the alterations that occurred in these institutions in Europe during its period of rapid economic change. But in the present underdeveloped countries, economic and social groups have appeared which are not analogous to those that grew up in the older countries. Furthermore, the structure and strength of government in modern underdeveloped countries are unlike those of the nineteenth-century democracies or limited monarchies. Finally, the ideologies and attitudes that are most significant in underdeveloped countries are more closely akin to those of the advanced countries of today than to the appropriate historical analogues, those of the developing countries of a hundred years ago.

The dominant, although not universal, types of economic groups in underdeveloped countries include the following: labor organizations of a non-craft type, loosely organized or with only a

core of well organized workers; a group of landowners, in part the old landed aristocracy, but usually reinforced with the owners of modern estates for the production of tea, rubber, coffee, sugar, and the like; occasionally a group of new peasant proprietors supported by the government through land reforms, cooperatives, and improved agricultural credit facilities; a firmly entrenched business, financial, and possibly manufacturing class which may be numerically small and in part conservative but is adept in dealing both in the traditions and customs of the country and in modern business practices, in other words, an entrepreneurial class some of whose members would resist, while others would successfully exploit, opportunities for economic development. In addition to these groups there are of course the old ones that have hardly been touched by economic change—the paternalistic landowners, the peasant proprietors, the serfs, artisans, and money-lenders. While these traditional groups may create friction in any period of rapid change, they are probably of little significance in the entire process of development.

Socially, the groups that are of strategic importance for basic change in underdeveloped countries may be placed in two categories. One includes upper-class groups, more or less sophisticated or "westernized," whose members may at once profess democratic ideals and rationalize their own position in society in such a way as to resist changes that might damage that position. The other category includes lower-class groups which, with the possible exception of their leaders, are uneducated and ill suited to the traditional western type of democracy, yet intensely interested in social reform through political means. They are a major force with which governments must reckon.

Whether one describes these groups in economic or in social terms, the fact remains that they are fully conscious of themselves, of their place in society, and of the pressures exerted upon them as economic change occurs. The nature of historical evidence does not justify us in supposing that these groups are more clearly aware of basic changes in society than were roughly com-

parable groups in nineteenth-century Europe. But their political position is such that they certainly can protest against change, and even resist it, more effectively than could comparable groups in the countries in which rapid economic growth was taking place a century ago.

The alteration in social institutions in modern underdeveloped countries has followed rather closely the pattern set in the advanced countries during the nineteenth century. Among the major changes the following may be noted: those concerning the family, where there has occurred a partial breakdown of ties and authority, and frequently of structure, as workers have moved into company compounds or industrial towns; those concerning the role of women as workers and homemakers; those concerning work and attitudes toward work as the more or less self-directed agricultural or craft worker shifts into plantation, mine, or factory work and is subjected to factory discipline and the wage system; those concerning attitudes toward the authority of the clan or village heads, toward priests, employers, and government officials. As in the older industrialized countries, established religion is being at least partially broken down. In addition, there is a gradual reduction in illiteracy and a modernization of the educational system. The knowledge that industrialization may bring a higher standard of living to the majority of society is probably more firmly fixed in the minds of the populations of underdeveloped countries today than in those of the populations of the countries that were industrializing in the nineteenth century.

The major political changes resulting from partial economic development are in some ways similar to those present in the advanced countries at a comparable stage of development, and in some ways profoundly different. Like those of older countries, the governments of underdeveloped countries are decidedly centralized. But they differ in that, though weak and ineffectual by the standards now applied to governments of advanced countries, they are sensitive to the needs of the major groups in the popula-

tion, upon most of which they are dependent for support. Generally, they receive the loyalty of urban labor and of white-collar workers, and often of peasants, as a result of honest or specious reforms; the loyalty of mine and oil workers; and that of workers of foreign companies, as a result of developing nationalistic sentiments hostile to these companies. At the same time the dominant groups in government usually represent a stable combination of conservative businessmen and large landowners—stable in the sense that though there may be bitter internecine fights among these groups, there is rarely a relinquishing of power by them, or a seizing of power by the workers and peasants.

In other words, the governments of most underdeveloped countries, although not necessarily democratic, are more truly representative of their populations than the western democracies may be inclined to admit. This wide basis of support, while it does not necessarily result in practical implementation of programs for reform or in general social improvement, accounts for the basic stability of these governments, despite the frequency of cabinet revolutions and coups.

Of perhaps even greater significance are the ideological results produced by partial economic development on the countries concerned. These center on the absorption of at least two major concepts from the more highly developed countries: that of the desirability of more nearly equal political treatment for the majority of the population; and that of the right of the majority to a reasonable, and if possible to a rising, standard of living. All governments must pay lip service, if nothing else, to the desirability of these two ideals. Only a foolhardy government, whether fascist, communist, autocratic, or democratic, would openly support an extended program that advocated economic development at the price of the destruction of any large group in the population.

In sharp contrast to these basic conditions in underdeveloped countries are the conditions that existed during the process of industrialization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Historically, rapid change occurred as and when the newer finan-

cial, commercial, and manufacturing groups combined with an increasingly centralized government to break down old craft restrictions over commerce and manufacture. Landed interests lost political power as their relative economic position declined in importance. Labor, traditionally weak, lost whatever protection the old journeymen's societies had given it. Peasant proprietors and tenants-at-will were displaced as agriculture was directed increasingly toward cash-crop production. Much of the capital accumulation, the alteration of the structure of production, and the change of "climate" in which economic activity was carried on occurred, if not at the expense of the landed classes and labor, at least in such ways that the contrasts between them and the rising business and manufacturing groups were sharpened. Of course economic development raised the level of production remarkably, but only at a much later stage were the benefits of industrial capitalist production transferred to a majority of the population—through political reform, protective labor legislation, agricultural reform, and the like. In the earlier stages of western development such a transfer of benefits to the majority would have been considered not only unattainable but undesirable.

The underdeveloped countries of today, on the other hand—containing social and economic groups that are self-conscious and fully aware of the effect of thoroughgoing change upon themselves—are determined to acquire the wider benefits of industrialization without being willing to undergo the social costs involved in earlier industrialization. Nor can any responsible government contemplate treating one class, much less a majority of its population, in a manner that was not only customary but entirely acceptable in the nineteenth century. Except in countries successfully patterning themselves on Soviet Russia, capital cannot be accumulated today, as it was in Japan, by unconscionable taxation of landholders. Workers cannot be made to produce under the conditions, or for the wages, of the nineteenth century, unless government provides offsetting benefits, such as public housing,

family subsidies, and the like. Government cannot conspicuously favor, by marked tax relief or heavy subsidy, the new manufacturers at the expense of other groups, except in peculiar circumstances, such as those involving national defense.

In fact, partial economic development has so profoundly affected underdeveloped countries that comparison of their present and potential growth with that of the countries that were growing in the nineteenth century is of practical value only in detail and not in general. The historical record shows, for example, that certain industries, such as textiles, are capable of rapid growth in an otherwise backward economy. It indicates also that certain institutions, such as the putting-out system and the piece-work method of wage payment, are closely associated with rapid economic change. Such specific items of experience can be usefully applied to the case of underdeveloped countries. But it is unjustified to assume that business combination will or can follow patterns similar to those it has taken in northern Europe and North America. To assume that private initiative unhampered by government intervention will follow the previous course is even less warranted. Indeed, it is possible that new kinds of ethics or even religions, resulting logically from the present condition of partial development but entirely unlike the ethics and religions of countries that industrialized at an earlier time, may mold further development so forcibly that the profit motive, for example, or the incentive to work for material improvement may be seriously affected.

In short, the basic social, political and ideological changes, as well as the economic changes that partial development has already brought, make it out of the question for underdeveloped countries to copy the earlier patterns of economic growth. Whatever the future direction that an underdeveloped country may pursue, that process cannot be abstracted from the institutions, ideals, and attitudes that have been established in it already by partial economic development.

III

There are, then, certain restrictions placed on future growth by the existing conditions of partial development, and when the complexity and interdependence of the forces that result in thoroughgoing economic change are recalled, it should be clear that additional limitations are attached to any single method of stimulating growth. That method which advocates heavy capital investment as the key to rapid economic development is particularly worthy of examination in this connection, as demonstrating not only the inadequacy of concentrating on a single solution to the problem but also the necessity of accepting as a goal gradual, rather than rapid, change.

Of primary concern to those who advise heavy investment for rapid development is, of course, the source or sources of capital. Many suggestions have been considered, among the most important of which are the massive use of intergovernmental loans; the encouragement of private foreign investment by binding guarantees of the recipient country, or by guarantee of capital or remission of income taxes by the investing country; heavy taxation for overall development purposes; differential taxation to encourage local initiative and investment; plowing back of profits by domestic industry; and a policy of protection. But each solution, when studied in detail, either tends to appear somewhat impractical or is whittled down to a level of insignificance; in any event, it is decidedly unsatisfactory.

In part the reason for this is found in the fields of domestic and international politics: on the one hand, the self-awareness and political power of the various economic groups making up the population of an underdeveloped country; on the other hand, the more or less aggressive nationalism displayed by underdeveloped countries since the end of World War II.

Opinions may differ as to whether or not private direct foreign investment has been disturbed by nationalistic tendencies in these countries. There is no doubt that such investment is continuing

—but at a rate that is too slow, and in fields that are too specialized for substantial balanced economic growth. Private foreign portfolio investments, historically important in financing governments, railways, and public utilities, are today unpopular among capitalists; and their nearest substitutes, intergovernmental loans, are in the last analysis subject to control by the populations, including the taxpayers, of the investing country. Remission of income taxes in the investing country as a reward of private foreign investment is subject to the charge of favoritism by other investors in that country. Agreements guaranteeing capital, if their provisions were pressed to the limit, could result in grave accusations of economic imperialism.

The success of internal measures taken by an underdeveloped country to encourage capital formation is equally dubious. Again, differential taxation could be regarded as favoritism, while a vigorous general taxation program in behalf of overall development would be difficult to enforce in countries notoriously undisciplined in bearing heavy tax loads. The value of protection in inducing new investment, as contrasted with its success in sheltering old investment, is slight if not insignificant. The plowing back of profits as a means of encouraging fundamental change is so slow as to be almost hopelessly discouraging.

Brief consideration of other methods of capital accumulation which were formerly successful shows that for various reasons they are likely to prove relatively useless today. Major domestic sources of capital used to take the form of accumulations from other fields of economic activity: from trade in primary products and manufactured goods; from banking; from speculation in money and commodities, including rural and urban lands; from government contracts; and to some extent from government subsidies. But the state of partial development existing in the modern underdeveloped countries acts, in one way or another, to hamper the effectiveness of these formerly satisfactory ways of obtaining capital. To turn accumulations from other fields of economic activity to the desideratum of all underdeveloped countries, in-

dustrial growth, necessitates the existence of a market in that area more attractive than those already established in trade and traditional production. Such a market can be built up only slowly. Unconscionable profits on government contracts and conspicuous speculative gains are liable to receive harsh treatment from any government that pretends to look after the interests of the bulk of its population. Nor is such a government in a position to grant subsidies or other favors, except in very special cases.

Finally, though development plans have been elaborated in great detail, the basic capacity of governments of underdeveloped countries to finance economic change unsupported by outside aid is not very great. At present, among all areas of investment, the most optimistic impression is produced by private and public, foreign and domestic capital moving into the fields of power, communications, irrigation, and transportation. But vital as this activity is, in itself it is probably insufficient to induce any great amount of balanced economic growth.

Dependence on investment alone as a solution to the problem of development thus appears to be unwarranted. And it should be emphasized that the limited value of investment is typical of all other solutions, when any one is undertaken as an exclusive measure for development. An alternative, that of development through technical assistance, is highly attractive because it brings to underdeveloped countries the most tangible results of economic advance—modern tools and machinery, better breeds of plants and animals, sophisticated engineering skills. So far as these improved tools and techniques replace those that have survived only from inertia or tradition, they offer an opportunity of achieving much solid improvement. But, like investment, technical assistance can be relied upon only up to a certain point. We have learned through trial and error that modern agricultural hand tools and animal-drawn equipment are almost universally helpful, but that gasoline-powered threshing machines and gang plows are strictly limited in their use by the nature of agricultural organization, transportation facilities, marketing techniques, and the like. Again, in many underdeveloped countries bulldozers cannot com-

pete in economic terms with axes, picks, and shovels. Thus the solution of development problems through technical assistance alone, as through investment alone, is restricted by barriers that are extraordinarily difficult to overcome, if they are not insurmountable.

The same limitations govern other approaches to the problem. There has recently been a tendency to stress the significance of size of plant in economic change. Here two contrasting trends appear: one, common among underdeveloped countries themselves, stresses large-scale production, such as a modern steel industry, which in some cases cannot be really justified in economic terms alone; and a more recent tendency, furthered by certain experts in the field, underscores the value of small-scale units, either of the traditional or of the cooperative type of business organization. The latter approach points to the adaptability of small-scale industry, both in limited markets where large-scale industry cannot get or maintain a foothold and in association with certain large-scale industries already established. On the other hand, there is no doubt that large-scale production, supposing conditions are ripe for its application, offers the most spectacular opportunities for rapid advance.

But whether emphasis is laid on the value of large-scale or of small-scale enterprise, alteration in the scale of production cannot by itself go very far in promoting economic change. The size of the production unit appropriate to a given situation is determined by the size and nature of the market for the product, and by the technical and institutional requirements of effective organization of the factors of production. Tradition and inertia, or grandiose policy, may maintain the average firm at a size that is either too small or too large for development needs, with the result that alert entrepreneurs can make a definite advance by adjusting the size of their firms to meet more nearly the real requirements of economic growth. But even the ablest entrepreneur must work within the confines of a market over which he may have negligible control, and with suppliers of materials and of

capital, and even with workers, whose ways of operation he can do little to alter.

The limited value of adjusting the scale of production to promote economic growth naturally leads to consideration of the effectiveness of changing the market structure and the organization of production as alternative solutions of the problem. These two solutions, which up to now have received comparatively little attention, should be examined as seriously as those that have been chiefly relied upon in plans for economic development.

In regard to the first, it is of course generally admitted that there are two types of markets with which underdeveloped countries are concerned: the foreign market for one exportable product, or more; and the domestic market for all kinds of products. The one market is cherished as the region in which foreign exchange is earned. The importance of the other market for balanced or reasonably independent economic growth is also clearly recognized. Yet much effort could profitably be put into a clearer analysis of the nature of these two markets, and of the effects of one upon the other. The foreign market, while providing capital that may be used to expand the productive capacity needed to satisfy the domestic market, may also act as a brake upon the latter's development, in that almost no policy for promoting domestic development may be safely undertaken which risks international complications such that the capacity to earn foreign exchange is damaged. Thus it could have been predicted that the recent attempts of countries like Bolivia and Guatemala to reorganize their internal economies would soon be hamstrung by their international ties.

The foreign and domestic markets are competitors not only for capital but also for the attention and patronage of the government. Up to now governments of underdeveloped countries appear to have tended to favor producers for the foreign market over those for the domestic. Yet it is probable that a minimum of government aid devoted to expanding the domestic market might have profound effects in promoting basic economic change.

Relatively little study has been made of this part of the problem, or of the capacities for growth which domestic markets have. It may be assumed, however, that here again the opportunities for change are limited. It would be advisable for underdeveloped countries to reconcile themselves to the prospect of home markets that may never expand beyond their political boundaries, for part of the price of late economic development is reduction of potential foreign markets through the establishment of tariff barriers in the economically advanced countries.

Possible alteration in the structure or organization of production is another approach to economic development that deserves more thorough examination than it has so far received. Historically, a characteristic industrial pattern found in economies undergoing rapid change has been contract production. Under this system the entrepreneurial function is divided between two persons: the merchant capitalist or large industrial producer on the one hand; and the craftsman or small producer on the other. Contract production has occurred in the following situations: in the older countries, as exemplified by the putting-out system and its many variants; in a relatively new underdeveloped country undergoing rapid change, like Japan; generally during wartime, when there is a sudden increase in demand for products beyond those that a country is geared to produce in normal times; in an industrial country at marginal points in the economy, or where market changes are unusually difficult to forecast, as in the American garment industry; in a new industry in an advanced economy, as in the early American automobile industry; and finally, in a highly developed, heavily capitalized industry, where demand for the product is so uncertain that the manufacturer cannot afford the investment demanded by the technical requirements of the product, as in the modern American airplane industry.

Even so brief a review of the uses to which the contract system has been put indicates that it might be of great value if it were applied more widely in underdeveloped countries than is the case at present. Essentially, it diverts to more pressing needs

productive capacity already in existence, even if the form of capital, the labor skill, and the managerial ability involved are not of the most appropriate sorts. The system, by organizing industry more closely, achieves some of the benefits of large-scale production, while at the same time it maintains the separate entities of the contracting parties and thereby somewhat reduces for each the risks inherent in rapid economic growth. Indeed it seems, on the historical record, that the contract system is probably both a result and a cause of industrial change—a result because it is an adaptive device used by manufacturers in a situation of great uncertainty, and a cause because its remarkable capacity for rapid expansion of production makes substantial change practicable.

It should be noted that these suggestions as to the desirability of further investigation of the nature of markets and of industrial structure in connection with economic growth do not imply that either of these approaches to economic development is superior to any other. What is indicated is that all possible approaches must be studied thoroughly, and practical measures applied along all lines—not merely along the more commonly stressed ones of investment and technical aid—if economic development is to make and hold substantial gains. No one method, taken by itself, is capable of altering the fabric of an economy. Nor can any single method be expected to “trigger” or stimulate very great changes in other aspects of economic and social life.

IV

Nor is the limited effectiveness of any one means of development the result of economic factors alone. While economic change, to reach its goals, must move forward by all methods and on all fronts, this would hold true in any isolated economy in any period of history. The special problem of the underdeveloped countries of today is that they are tied to the advanced countries by indissoluble bonds resulting from partial economic development. This connection is both material and non-material in nature,

and perhaps the narrowly economic problems involved are those that may be most easily overcome. By self-denial and ingenuity domestic capital may be developed, local markets may be improved, new techniques may be applied. But to do these things while retaining or expanding certain non-material values that the underdeveloped countries have absorbed from their contact with the advanced countries is an enormously difficult matter. It is hard to combine agricultural reform, including the promotion of a peasant-proprietor class or of agricultural cooperatives, with rapid expansion of agricultural production. It is probably even more difficult to build up a new business-capitalist class—one that is sufficiently powerful to be effective in economic change—in the face of traditional upper-class groups that will not yield their political position without a struggle, and of a class of workers who know too much of the social and political benefits of advanced capitalist society to be willing to put up with the economic abuses of early capitalism.

While the bonds between the economically advanced and the underdeveloped countries are indissoluble, they may be cut. Essentially this is what Communist China has done, rejecting more completely the social and political values of the advanced capitalist countries than their economic techniques and institutions and their trade. It is conceivable that economic development in China may proceed rapidly, as industrialization has proceeded rapidly in Soviet Russia, but at a cost in human values comparable with that which Russia has paid. Fortunately most underdeveloped countries are not so greedy of economic change in itself as to forget that it is only a means of achieving for their peoples as a whole a life that is richer in both material and non-material satisfactions. Thus, even when they are able to do so, they are reluctant to apply measures that, while substantially speeding up economic growth, would surely endanger many of the values they cherish. For these countries thoroughgoing economic development must of necessity be a slow process.

THE RELIGION OF PROGRESS IN AMERICA, 1890-1914

BY DAVID W. NOBLE

SEVERAL years ago an essay entitled "The Religion of Progress," by Professor Albert Salomon, appeared in *Social Research*.¹ Its central thesis is the author's belief that "The nineteenth and twentieth centuries are deeply religious epochs. The social and economic issues of modern movements cannot be separated from the religious meaning which men have attributed to their revolutionary action." These periods are religious epochs, in Salomon's estimation, because European intellectuals of the early nineteenth century came to read spiritual purpose into the historical process; they were keenly aware of the way in which new industrial and social forces had broken the traditional patterns of life, and at the same time they felt the inability of established religious and political precepts to provide guidance through the surrounding confusions of the day. And therefore they rejected the right of such precepts to command their allegiance. Standing as heirs to the tremendous intellectual development of the eighteenth century, their central experience, says Salomon, was of "the power of the human mind and the solitude of the modern intellectual." This situation produced what he calls "Romantic Messianism." Reacting against the spiritual as well as the social emptiness of their age, members of the romantic movement became religious prophets. They were religious because they sought to develop doctrines that could influence human wills and attitudes by the creation of a new universe of absolute meaning; they created a new ontology to replace the lost belief in transcendence. And the two new realities they offered the lonely individual were "Humanity" and "History."

¹ Albert Salomon, "The Religion of Progress," in *Social Research*, vol. 13 (December 1946) pp. 441-62.

Underneath the present anarchy, these nineteenth-century prophets assured their contemporaries, were laws of progress. Amidst the social wreckage, amidst the myriads of atomic individuals, these laws of progress were creating a new society, a society of perfect cooperation and absolute harmony. "Humanity" was the place where the lost individual would be saved, and "History" was the means for that salvation, because, in Salomon's words, "History is the self-realization of the emerging absolute."

But, while the individual was promised the inevitable outcome of progress in the perfect cooperative commonwealth, this was not a message of quietism. A belief in progress, a spiritual union with the ongoing process, was necessary for its consummation; man's mind and soul could receive the proper inspiration and guidance only when he enthusiastically shared the belief in the spiritual power underlying progress. The world was a moral struggle in which man must fight against the evil of the present anarchy, the present negative individualism, and fight for the coming Kingdom of God on Earth, with its merging of the individual into the social whole. The communicant in the religion of progress was given the exhilarating message, then, that he was free to create the future because the social reality of which he was a part was above the control of natural law and above the control of what was usually called history, the institutions and traditions of the past; he was free to create a future whose coming, nevertheless, was inevitable and whose rules were absolute.

Professor Salomon's contention that many of the particular secular theories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries obtain their meaning from an overall religious context, and the outline he has provided of the religion of progress, which in many instances provides that context, are worthy of attention by students of American intellectual history. This is especially true for those who have been working on the problem of the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century in the American climate of opinion. The major emphasis of these students has been on the changes in technical theories held in the natural sciences, the

social sciences, and philosophy; the conclusions reached have stressed the revolutionary nature of those changes.² But this paper, using Professor Salomon's definition of the religion of progress as a point of reference, is designed to call into question the almost unqualified belief in a radical transition of American social thought from its romantic, theological basis in 1850 to a matter-of-fact, objective, scientific orientation by 1920.

Two of the key points of this intellectual revolution that have been singled out as basic in importance concern concepts of history and the relation of the individual and society. Into the late nineteenth century Americans continued to look at history through the eyes of the eighteenth century. One went to history to discover the eternal principles of human nature and institutional life. History had no meaning in terms of movement and change. The corollary of this concept of history was that the individual had certain inherent psychological traits, that he was a self-sufficient atom, and that society was therefore a mechanical, artificial aggregation of these self-contained individuals.

By the 1890s, however, scholars in philosophy and the social sciences had broken from this older pattern and had begun to work out a totally new position. They postulated that the individual was not self-contained, that he was not born with a fixed nature. Rather he came completely unformed into society, and his nature was the product of his social environment. Society,

² Among the studies that have stressed the manner in which the Darwinian conception of evolution revolutionized American thought in the latter nineteenth century are: Bert J. Loewenberg, "The Reaction of American Scientists to Darwinism," in *American Historical Review*, vol. 38 (July 1933) pp. 687-701, "Evolution in New England," in *New England Quarterly*, vol. 8 (June 1935) pp. 232-57, and "Darwinism Comes to America, 1859-1900," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. 28 (December 1941) pp. 339-68; Max H. Fisch, "Evolution in American Philosophy," in *Philosophical Review*, vol. 56 (July 1947) pp. 357-73; Sidney Ratner, "Evolution and the Rise of the Scientific Spirit in America," in *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 3 (January 1936) pp. 104-22; Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in America* (Philadelphia 1945); Stow Persons, *Free Religion* (New Haven 1947); Stow Persons, ed., *Evolutionary Thought in America* (New Haven 1950); and Philip P. Wiener, *Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1949).

therefore, could not be an artificial creation, mechanical in form. It was a real entity, with a continuity and life of its own. Furthermore, the individual and society were part of history; as there was no fixed human nature, so there was no fixed form for society; society was an historical product, and it was constantly changing as new patterns of historical forces emerged. The individual and the society of which he was a member could be defined only in terms of temporary and unique historical moments.

It is the consensus of the scholars who have investigated this philosophical revolution that American intellectuals in the years from 1890 to 1920 ceased to think in terms of absolutes; fixed reality had vanished under the pressure of the concept of constant historical change, and was replaced by a theory of relativism. This relativism, in turn, has been used by other scholars as a fundamental principle by which to interpret the total sweep of American intellectual history in the twentieth century. It is therefore important, for all aspects of historical interpretation, to qualify the hold of historical relativism on the American mind before 1920, if this radical thesis is an exaggeration. And it is indeed, in the estimation of the present writer, a serious over-emphasis.

I

Students of this change in philosophical theory have stressed its American and its academic origins. This has meant that scholarly treatment of the generation of scholars of the 1880s and 1890s—while recognizing that these intellectual pioneers had important European educational experiences, especially in Germany, and that their ideas were related to the general historical context of their day—has largely divorced them from the world of political and social philosophy at home and abroad. One is given the impression that the men of this generation returned from Europe schooled in certain technical ideas of human nature and society and proceeded to utilize them to rebuild established disciplines,

like economics, political science, and history, or to create new disciplines, such as sociology and social psychology. Once their doctrines were formed, in the calm of their laboratories or libraries, they applied them to current social and political problems, but in the process of creating hypotheses they were properly objective and scientific.

It is not entirely accurate, however, that the break from eighteenth-century patterns of thought was initiated in America by academic theoreticians. There is evidence that serious lay thinkers, represented in this essay by Henry D. Lloyd, were searching for theories of human nature, society, and history in the 1870s and 1880s, in an effort to replace the traditional individualistic and ahistorical ones they had inherited—searching for those theories a decade before the academic revolution. And there is evidence that they had found such theories in the writings of Europeans who can be classed as prophets of the religion of progress. Furthermore, these theories had a certain similarity to the key concepts of the individual, society, and history that were worked out by the academicians in the succeeding decades, and perhaps a pervading influence beyond that assumed by present scholarship.

The early nineteenth-century romantics had rejected the individualistic conception of a fixed human nature; they had rejected the notion of society as a mechanical aggregation of such self-sufficient individuals; and they had rejected the view of history as essentially static. Society was a real entity from which the individual drew his meaning, and both society and the individual were caught up in an historical process of change and transition. This did not lead them to the position of historical relativism which, it is claimed, was held by the American social scientists, and which permeated the American climate of opinion by 1914, because the society with which they were concerned was not the immediate society but a metaphysical absolute, which Salomon calls "Humanity." The society of the moment, with its faulty traditions and institutions, was an entangling web of evil from

which the individual must extricate himself to find salvation in the true "Society," through the sublimation of self in the service of the whole. In turn the transitions, the changes of history were not the essence of true "History," which was the unfolding of the progressive laws of the absolute, cutting through the irrelevancies, the accidental occurrences of mundane history. Man and society changed within the ongoing historical process, but in accordance with a fixed plan and toward the complete fruition of the perfect society of total cooperation and brotherhood. "History" and "Humanity" were capable of change, but only within the set limits of a preestablished scheme of progress.

These philosophic concepts of the European religion of progress, as well as its basic assumption of a world that had become meaningless and chaotic, formed the intellectual framework of the famous muckraker, Henry Demarest Lloyd. Shaping his ideas in the 1870s and 1880s, Lloyd was certain that his age was about to be transformed by a new religion. With approval he cited Mazzini that "The basis of the new religion will be the recognition of the law of progress."³ Instead of feeling unrestrained optimism, however, Lloyd was filled with grave forebodings about the future of America. America was in crisis. Its economy and its very life had been transformed by the coming of industrialism, under which individuals were torn loose from meaningful social relations and left to drift, rootless and defenseless before the crushing power of the new economic institutions. The traditions, the morality, the social and political forms of the past had ceased to be relevant in the new situation, and could provide no guidance or protection to the individual in this new world, which so resembled a jungle as its frightened individuals turned cannibal to assure survival.

And yet Lloyd gloried in the crisis. It might mean the total destruction of civilization; it did, however, provide, for the first time, the conditions for the total salvation of man. It did this

³ Henry Demarest Lloyd, Transcript Notebook 10, October 1888, p. 42 (Lloyd Papers, Madison, Wisconsin).

in two ways. In the first place, it had smashed the old institutional life of man and had made untenable his inherited philosophies. It had created the conditions of total freedom which would enable man to construct his future without the handicap of relating it to a past which was so full of error. Americans had been the prisoners of the philosophy of Herbert Spencer, which had compounded a doubly fallacious position in postulating that man was controlled by physical laws and that man was a self-contained atom, and that society was an artificial and mechanical aggregation of these atoms.

Now, declared Lloyd, the people were free to realize that "Man is the creator and redeemer of himself and society."⁴ Man was free from the control of physical law, because he was not born with a given set of psychological traits but was born into society, which provided him with his nature. Americans must accept this fact of a real society; they must realize that "... there is a people, and it is as different from a mere juxtaposition of persons as a globe of glass from the handful of sand out of which it was melted."⁵ They must comprehend that society is completely autonomous from any restraining physical or psychological forces: that "Authority is not a pre-existing standard, outside of humanity, which it receives as legislation from a superior power; but is *created* by mankind, piece by piece."⁶ There were no given social laws that man must follow, because "The science of society is what we make it"; there was no transcendent power to control the destiny of man, because "Humanity is to 'worship' nothing; it is to will, create, produce, infinitely, never reaching its ideal because its ideal is itself, part of its task of creation and is never done."⁷

Industrialism, then, had provided the intellectual atmosphere necessary for the exercise of man's will, completely unrestrained by past influences. It had also created the material conditions

⁴ Lloyd, *Man the Social Creator* (New York 1906) p. 3.

⁵ Lloyd, *Wealth Against Commonwealth* (New York 1894) p. 497.

⁶ Lloyd, Transcript Card notes, Box 20, p. 3.

⁷ Lloyd, Transcript New Zealand Notebook, 1899, p. 1.

necessary for the fulfillment of the religion of progress, which was the force that man would use to end the present chaos and would follow in the establishment of the perfect cooperative commonwealth. "The sudden and vast expansion of modern business," he proclaimed, "has made the cooperative commonwealth a physical fact. Now comes the next expansion—that which will make the cooperative commonwealth a moral fact."⁸

At this point a curious dichotomy entered into Lloyd's writing. He had refuted Spencer's position because it did not realize the social nature of man or the historical context of society. But a dual theme ran through Lloyd's thinking about the nature of society and history. On the one hand, he was certain that society exists, and that the individual is part of it, and that this fact makes possible a belief in the religion of progress, whose major theme is the worship of a perfectly integrated humanity. He wrote, "If it be shown by the investigations of science, verifying the intuitions of the inspired . . . that a community can think together and act together, can feel; that public opinion, scientifically, is an entity, not a fortuitous collision of individual thoughts . . . then will the basis be laid, in the demonstration and recognition of this great and new fact, for a new religion."⁹ But he rejected the idea that his contemporary Americans were members of a society to which they should give allegiance. They must transcend this society, justified in their action by the fact that "If history has any lesson, it is that mankind is ceaselessly outgrowing their institutions—all of them."

The society Lloyd wanted man to be part of was not a sociological fact; it was metaphysical, transcending its mundane name-sake. But it might, it would, come to pass on earth if men so willed it through the power of religion. "Ultimately," he affirmed, in *Man the Social Creator* (p. 174), "everyone is the people—but no such millennial social entity exists now"; and "The people is . . . the name of an ideal. A multitude becomes a people as it becomes united in faith and works."

⁸ Lloyd, Transcript Manuscript of 1896, p. 126.

⁹ Lloyd, Transcript Notebook 11, 1888, p. 288.

Thus Lloyd urged his contemporaries to join the fight against the evil and inertia of the social confusion of the day, to accept a religion of social solidarity, and to make the cooperative commonwealth a reality, an absolute reality that would stand above the relativities of all past societies. He urged them on with the assurance that they could not lose the fight. Returning from the religious level of creative inspiration to the realm of social theory, he paradoxically reaffirmed the sociological inevitability of the coming social utopia. It was a scientific fact, he reasserted, that men in close face-to-face contact must express mutual sympathy and love. All must understand, therefore, that the world is standing on the edge of total salvation; all must be prepared for the final successful struggle at Armeggedon—because, as he expressed it in *Man the Social Creator* (p. 72), "Already through modern industry, the physical contact of all peoples is an almost accomplished fact."

Triumphantly he illustrated how this moment of opportunity was produced by irresistible cosmic forces. It was no accident, he wrote, that "We are on the eve of another of the great expansions—or extensions—which have made up the civilization, evangelization of the world." Through religious inspiration the new prophets had gained insight into the true meaning of "History"; they had transcended the relativity of history and had revealed to them the laws of progress, of "History." They had thus become sociologists as well as religious prophets, men of science who could read the laws of progress into the future and work for their establishment as the culmination of a totally integrated humanity. They had learned that "The progress of humanity . . . is proceeding according to an intelligent plan, that line of march is irresistible, and the reformer's work is to remove one by one the obstructions in its way, strip off from growing man the outworn, outgrown forms at the instant of transition from one period to another . . . Mankind's progress is toward absolute truth." "The whole theory of true reform is to set free the 'inward perfecting principle within the individual and society,' to use Aristotle's

words, which when released from interceptions and oppressions can be easily guided to move to its proper ends."¹⁰ They had learned, therefore, the inevitable coming of this crisis, its irresistible conclusion in the establishment of "Humanity," and the manner in which they could cooperate in its creation.

As a religious prophet, Lloyd knew what the final outcome of progress was to be; he realized, however, that he lacked the detailed knowledge to be a sociologist also, to point out the exact manner in which "Humanity" would come into being. He looked forward, therefore, with eager anticipation to the coming of younger men who would combine the qualities of prophet and social scientist, to "the new Newton," as he put it in *Man the Social Creator* (p. 14), "who will work out the attraction of men for each other as the gravitating force which explains the position, motion and relations of the social atoms and the social masses." And almost at the moment of his rather early death, Lloyd must have seen the leadership of his religion of progress pass to social scientists who shared his faith—most dramatically to those who were working specifically on the subject of the relation of the individual and society: the social psychologists.

II

In the histories of social psychology, James Mark Baldwin and Charles Horton Cooley are described as two of the most important pioneers in breaking down the antiquated philosophies of a given human nature and an artificial, mechanical society. Their contributions to the education of the American mind in making understood the meaning of evolution, the reality of society, the social nature of the individual, and the historical context of the individual and society have all been stressed. Their place in the history of American thought is established as that of radical innovators leading Americans to the scientific position of historical relativism. Lloyd, however, must have recognized their most important cultural role as the priest-scientists of the true religion.

¹⁰ Lloyd, Transcript Notebook 12, 1888, p. 330.

One of the students of Baldwin's social psychology has written, "The basic point that Baldwin makes about the self is that it is a 'social product' . . . The old atomistic concepts of the self he rejects as false; they rest on the assumption that the individual and society are separate entities. The individual, on the contrary, is always a part of the group out of which he has emerged."¹¹ If the individual is always part of the group out of which he has emerged, it might be argued, however, that he is circumscribed by his social inheritance, that he can aspire to no more than he has learned from the group, that he has no standards to judge its inadequacies. Baldwin, believing in progress and acutely aware of this problem, had no intention of suggesting that the individual was merely a social product. He, too, like Lloyd, distinguished between immediate society and the coming perfect "Society." Mundane society was an imperfect expression of "Society," and the various historical societies of man must continue to give way until "Society" had found complete expression. The individual, then, for Baldwin, was the product of historical society only to the extent that it inculcated in him the principles of "Society"; through inspiration and intuition and, finally, social science, he had the ability to understand how those principles diverged from the immediate status of society; and he had the freedom to transcend that status and mold the historical society into the likeness of the "Society."

The heart of Baldwin's social psychology is a description of an absolute social process outside of history. There are, he contended,¹² three stages of social development. "These modes of 'social' or collective life are: (1) the instinctive or gregarious; (2) the spontaneous or plastic; and (3) the reflective or social proper." The first stage finds man dependent upon biology for his bond of union. Its characteristics are that man's endowment is physically inherited, and therefore the "habits of life do not have to be acquired." The next stage is the spontaneous or

¹¹ Vahan D. Sewny, *The Social Theory of James Mark Baldwin* (New York 1945) p. 19.

¹² James Mark Baldwin, *The Individual and Society* (Boston 1911) pp. 43, 46.

plastic. This period marks the escape of man from the control of simple biological laws. The habits of this stage "are not inherited, but learned." In order to be plastic, the individual must be relatively free from the compulsion of inherited instinct. The modification of function and structure involved in learning requires the decay of fixed reactions. "The individual grows into the tradition of the group . . . But . . . this plastic learning is an agency of conformity, conservation, stability and solidarity. The individual does not go beyond what the group life has already acquired; his learning is limited to tradition." The third and final stage of social life is "the reflective or social group proper." In this period the individual is not merely plastic before the social current; now "he intentionally and voluntarily cooperates with others in pursuit of intelligent ends." The characteristics of this final stage are that ". . . intelligent acts of cooperation cannot be considered as due to either physical or social heredity. . . . They are social novelties."

Here was scientific support for Lloyd's thesis that man was free from physical and social controls, free to create his own future. Here is undeniable evidence that Baldwin conceived of individual and social development taking place within a context of absolute progress that was distinct from the societies of history. The individual was social in nature, but the society to which he belonged was a spiritual absolute. History was not static; it meant change and transition, but only according to the laws of progress leading to the culmination of the perfect society.

Man was free for Baldwin, as he was for Lloyd, to create the cooperative commonwealth; he had the freedom to bring to fruition the preordained. And so the curious tension between the sociological and religious facts of social solidarity existed also in Baldwin's thinking. In sociological terms, he could assure his readers that "the individual's normal growth leads him into essential solidarity with his fellows," but he continued to believe that the final social unity must be brought about by a religious

spirit in man. When the individual had reached the third and final stage of social evolution he was free, because "in the ethical realm the individual may rule himself by rules which are in advance of those which society prescribes." Such rules, however, come from the inspiration the individual gets from religion, from the religion of humanity.

This was the revolutionary leaven which would lead the individual to create the social utopia because, he explained,¹³ "it does not follow from this that the group, as it exists, is the object of religion. The existing group . . . is not what the religious ideal denotes. . . . Religion of humanity, then, to be a religion, must mean religion of ideal humanity." Free will, progress, social solidarity were all linked by Baldwin to religion, and thus he declared, "We are obliged to conclude that, instead of disappearing, religion in some form will abide. In the higher union of the motives of personal and social interest in that of religion, there is a return on another plane to the early state of things noted by sociologists in primitive culture, where religion dominated both individual and social life."

The era of perfect social solidarity would be reached by individual effort under the inspiration of religion, but Baldwin could also add the assurance that the individual was cooperating with a spiritual force that must reach fulfillment: "The individual may wait for recognition," he affirmed, "he may suffer imprisonment, he may be muzzled for thinking his thoughts, he may die and with him the truth to which he gave but silent birth. But the world comes, by its slower progress, to traverse the path in which he worked to lead it."¹⁴

In the history of social psychology, Charles Horton Cooley has been given the role of the modernizer of Baldwin's pioneering efforts. He dropped Baldwin's triadic scheme of social development; and his technical description of the manner in which the

¹³ Baldwin, *Genetic Theory of Reality* (New York 1915) pp. 114, 117.

¹⁴ Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development* (New York 1897) p. 174.

individual responds to his social environment is more acceptable to modern students. But Cooley did not deviate from the religious beliefs of the older man. Indeed, Baldwin had none of the sense of critical urgency which had moved Lloyd. Grandly, with the dignity of inexorability, the third and final stage of social evolution was coming into being. Cooley, however, had both a profound sense of crisis and an emotional conviction of the religion of progress which went deeper than that of Baldwin. Like Lloyd, he believed that "The modern enlargement of relations has in part broken down the old groups, based chiefly on locality, family and class, and brought in a somewhat formless and unchannelled state of things."¹⁵ He, too, was fearful that, in the course of this chaos, mankind would become utterly lost. Finally, his apprehensions also were overbalanced by the unique opportunity for total salvation that seemed to him to be presented by such a fluid condition.

Cooley worked out a sociological theory which supported Lloyd's belief that man is by nature basically social, that he cooperates completely with those individuals with whom he has close contact, that human nature is altruistic, and that selfishness or egoism is not part of human nature but is the result of the confusions of the past, of the inadequacies of human organizations. Optimistically he declared, therefore, that "The improvement of society does not call for any essential change in human nature but . . . larger and higher applications of its familiar impulses."¹⁶ Even more optimistically, he visualized that this could be done in the future because industrialism had brought man into close contact through improved means of communication: "Modern communication fulfills one condition of the 'Kingdom' by bringing all mankind into somewhat familiar intercourse."¹⁷

On a purely sociological level, according to Cooley's thesis, there need not be any apprehension for the future. Men in close

¹⁵ Charles Cooley, *Social Process* (New York 1920) p. 391.

¹⁶ Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York 1912) p. 37.

¹⁷ Cooley, *Journals*, vol. 15 (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1902) p. 68.

contact inevitably loved each other; industrialism had brought them into a face-to-face position. But Cooley continued to worry. The confusion of the present, the erroneous attitudes of the past all inhibited the spontaneous flowering of the goodness of man, and hence he felt a duty to join in the education of the people, in order to make them aware that they were free from the control of physical law and social tradition, that "The distinctive thing in human evolution . . . is the development of a process which is not fixed but plastic."

But, in the sociologist's estimation, his contemporaries needed more than understanding, more than technical knowledge to free themselves from their society and from history. Turning religious prophet, Cooley proclaimed that only a new religion could so free man from his commitments to the past that social evolution could proceed; only a new religion of humanity could provide the necessary discipline for the individual to blend himself into society. "We need," Cooley affirmed, "the feeling of a larger life without ourselves. . . . It is wholesome to feel oneself part of a great whole, and to expand the individual life into that, to cherish only that part of oneself that contributes to the whole, to estimate oneself and others by capacity to serve the whole."¹⁸

Cooley expressed his own profound union with the new religion of progress in these lines: "It is God that is working. Life is onward, glorious, transcendent. I am in it; a part of it." And he was certain that his was a feeling which was winning the hearts of his countrymen. "Will not the idea of God and the social state tend to merge," he asked rhetorically in *Social Progress* (p. 418), "and thus patriotism and religion reinforce each other—a new unity of Church and State?" What was needed then to bring a swift end to the crisis was a religious attitude toward society expressed through "The idealization of the state, the impressing of a unitary life upon the hearts of the people by tradition, poetry, music, architecture, national celebrations and memorials, and by a religion and a philosophy teaching the individual

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. 12 (1897) p. 53.

that he is a member of a glorious whole to which he owes devotion."

Thus Cooley, too, wavered between believing in the inevitability of social evolution and in its dependence on individual initiative inspired by a religious attitude. And he also always sublimated this dichotomy with an appeal to Americans to join the struggle for a cause which must triumph. Clearly he demonstrated to them the manner in which society and history bent before the forces of "Society" and "History." Although his sociological theory postulated that man is formed by the society into which he is born, and that his standards of judgment must be relative to this particular historical moment—because, in Cooley's own words, "The organic view of mind calls for social knowledge as the basis of morality. We live in a system, and to achieve right ends we must learn to understand that system"—still Cooley could assure his readers that the established order was not to be equated with right. Still he could affirm the right of the individual to destroy his society, because his sociology also included a "Society" morally superior to society: a "Society" that claimed the individual's ultimate allegiance; a "Society" that would destroy all societies as it found expression through the "Historical" process of inevitable progress. Until the moment of the final establishment of the perfect "Humanity," right would never coincide with the established society, and the individual, caught up in the metaphysical process, would always reject the status quo. In *Social Process* (p. 109) Cooley wrote: ". . . if we accept the idea that life is progress, it is easy to see that no such coincidence is to be expected. If we are moving onward and upward by the formulation of higher ideals and the struggle to obtain them, then our conscience will always be going out from and discrediting the actual forms of power."

It followed then that "New right, or moral progress, always begins in a revolt against institutions." Therefore, as Cooley put it in *Social Process* (p. 103), his contemporary Americans should reject their present society and work for the fulfillment of

the real "Society" of perfect harmony. They must work and fight with the understanding that "history is vast moral drama" in which they are the soldiers of righteousness; they must strive with assurance because "the central fact of history from the psychological point of view is the gradual enlargement of social consciousness and rational cooperation"; strive with absolute confidence because, if they fail as individuals, "the unconscious forces inevitably set to work to correct the wrong. . . . It is a wound against which the moral organism asserts its recuperative energy."

III

This essay has suggested so far that the radical shift in theories of human nature, society, and history which occurred in late nineteenth-century America did not originate in technical ideas worked out by academicians, developing their own special disciplines, but that rather these men shared in a larger intellectual movement which influenced their attitudes toward the principles of their particular fields and which enveloped those principles. It will be further suggested, however, that while lay thinkers like Lloyd first absorbed this new climate of opinion from European influences, its first extensive home was among academic thinkers; that they strengthened it by giving it scientific prestige, and that, in turn, other lay figures expressed their versions of the religion of progress with added precision and assurance, gained from a reading of men like Baldwin and Cooley. Non-academic philosophers of the first decade of the twentieth century would not suffer the same embarrassment from a lack of sanctions from the field of social science that had bothered Lloyd. And such support, buttressed still more by the enthusiasm for reform which swept America after 1900, spread the truly millennial hopes of a Charles Cooley among many men who were not professional sociologists. Within the limitations of space, two examples of this growing millennialism will be mentioned here: Walter Rauschenbusch and Herbert Croly.

As a young churchman of the 1890s, Walter Rauschenbusch had been confronted by the moral abyss which was the new American city. Self-consciously he turned to the new discipline of sociology for the knowledge to understand this frightening situation. By 1907 the now mature Rauschenbusch was prepared to share his learning with his fellow Christians in a major book, *Christianity and the Social Crisis*; and his message followed closely the outline of Cooley's sociology which, in turn, had paralleled the ideas of Henry Demarest Lloyd.

In familiar terms, Rauschenbusch announced that the major fact of American life was crisis—crisis born of industrialism. "The American Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the French Revolution in 1789," he wrote, "were the birth of modern democracy. But about the same time another revolution set in beside which these great events were puny."¹⁹ This was, of course, the industrial revolution. It had whirled the individual up and away from his established customs and habits, it had smashed the old economic institutions by which he had lived, it had destroyed his security. Alone, isolated man was sinking to the animal level. This was the crisis. Continuing the parallel with the views of Lloyd and Cooley, Rauschenbusch held the crisis to be both a mortal danger to man's future and the opportunity for man's total salvation. "Our civilization," he declared, "is passing through a great historic transition. We are at the parting of the ways. The final outcome may be the decay and extinction of Western Civilization, or it may be a new epoch in the evolution of the race, compared with which our present era will seem like a modified barbarism."²⁰ And he, too, could assure his readers that, in spite of the possibility of failure, a successful resolution of the crisis was almost inevitable, because an optimistic and hopeful attitude toward the crisis was supported by two principles based on the sociological doctrines of the day.

¹⁹ Walter Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis* (New York 1907) p. 214.

²⁰ Rauschenbusch, *Christianizing the Social Order* (New York 1912) p. 40.

The first was the fact that man was a social animal with a plastic nature molded by his social environment, and that society was an autonomous body, free from the control by fixed physical laws which was argued by the defenders of the status quo. Thanks to the efforts of the social scientists, he declared, we are "now coming to realize that within certain limits society is plastic." He reiterated, therefore, that man is free to create his own future, free to choose his destiny and end the crisis.

Then Rauschenbusch offered his troubled generation the even greater support of sociology in its promise to provide a free humanity the knowledge by which it could end the chaos without the possibility of failure. Sociology revealed the laws of progress that were working through society, laws that must inevitably bring about the Heavenly City on Earth. Translating Baldwin's theory of stages of social evolution in economic terms, he wrote, "... three economic orders are combining to make up the total of modern life: the pre-capitalistic which is passing away, the capitalistic which is in the flush of its strength, and the collectivistic which is still immature."²¹ Knowing the details of social evolution through the science of sociology, man was able to cooperate with progress to usher in the perfect social integration of the collectivistic order. Men could enter the present battle with the confidence born of self-knowledge, because "For the first time in religious history, we have the possibility of so directing religious energy by scientific knowledge that a comprehensive and conscious reconstruction of social life in the name of God is within the bounds of human possibility."²²

It was, perhaps, even more natural for Rauschenbusch to synthesize this contradiction of social freedom and social inevitability within the framework of religious belief than it had been for his predecessors. Victory was assured for the forces of social perfection, and yet there could be no automatic coming of utopia because man's social nature was not truly the product of his immediate

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 384.

²² Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, p. 207.

society. Mundane society, in its physical manifestations, was not to be equated with the coming "Society," which was essentially spiritual. Present society did not work to bring man to perfection; he could reach the social millennium only through his allegiance to the spiritual process of progress. He must fight to allow his true nature to emerge from its bondage to immediate social forces. "No man," Rauschenbusch warned, "can help the people until he is himself free from the spell which the present order has cast over our moral judgment . . . we need a religious faith to inspire and guide us in that task of redeeming the social life of humanity which is clearly laid upon our generation."²³

Americans, Rauschenbusch believed in 1907, were lacking this religious faith, this faith in the perfect society of the Kingdom of God on Earth. But by 1912, when *Christianizing the Social Order* was published, something wonderful, in Rauschenbusch's estimation, had occurred. "When *Christianity and the Social Crisis* was published in 1907," he declared in the later work (p. vii), "I thought I had said all that God had given me to say on our social problems. . . . But meanwhile the social awakening of our nation had set in like an equinoctial gale in March." Americans had come to believe in the religion of progress and humanity. Rauschenbusch now visualized the tremendously swift transformation of America. All of the areas of life but economics were socialized, and this last remaining citadel of the past must rapidly capitulate to the irresistible pressure. Rauschenbusch had ended his first book with these hopeful lines (p. 422): "Perhaps these nineteen centuries of Christian influence have been a long preliminary stage of growth and now the flower and fruit are almost here." His second book was based on the belief that his hope had become a certainty.

With each year after 1900 the tempo of reform movements quickened and carried with it the enthusiasm of progressive thinkers; the assurance of the sociologist, Cooley, and of the theologian, Rauschenbusch, that at last the millennium was

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 349-50.

appearing came to be shared by many contemporaries, one of whom was the political philosopher, Herbert Croly.

Croly's reputation as a political thinker rests on his book, *The Promise of American Life*, published in 1909. While it is clear that Croly shared the same faith in the religion of progress that was held by so many of his contemporaries, this was by no means an optimistic book. Rather it was offered as something of a necessary expedient to check the further disintegration of American society. For Croly, too, the major historical fact of the moment was the industrial revolution, and he also believed that it had shattered the solidarity of the community, bringing men into confused and highly competitive relationships with one another. The necessary task for national salvation was the remaking of a homogeneous social structure with cooperative attitudes held by the citizens. This was a task he saw blocked by traditional American political theory, which postulated the individual in atomistic, self-sufficient terms and society as merely a convenient artificial creation, and which also postulated that there were automatic forces working out a mechanically harmonious blending of these individuals.

The Promise of American Life was written, then, as an educational tract designed to demonstrate that the individual was not self-sufficient and self-enclosed but had a social nature which gained its identity from a very real society. Americans must therefore develop a new political theory based on the recognition of these facts, and they must use this new political theory as a constructive tool to end the present anarchy. But while Croly was convinced that man had a social nature that should find expression in new political forms, he was by no means sanguine about the immediate possibility of his contemporaries revealing their true natures.

He could not hope for this to occur suddenly or automatically because, fundamentally, he did not believe in a technical sociological theory of a social man produced by a real society. Again for Croly, as for Baldwin and Cooley, a social human nature was

a metaphysical term, associated with an ideal situation that must be achieved in the future; and similarly, the society of which the perfected individual must be a part was not the real society of America but an ideal "Society" which would appear as the culmination of social evolution. Indeed, the central core of *The Promise of American Life* is a discussion of the manner in which the individual can be shaken loose from past historical traditions and present social institutions. Croly, in 1909, was willing to set up an ideal of the American nation to which the individual could give devotion and, in doing so, gain the necessary discipline to subordinate his ordinary, selfish outlook and to become a member of a healthier, more organic society.

This idolization of the national ideal, however, was but a means of stemming the tide of the onrushing social chaos; it did not lift men into the sphere of "Humanity"; it did not take them out of history into the realm of progressive "History." The coming of the millennium depended for Croly, as it had for Rauschenbusch, on the conversion of Americans to a religion of social solidarity, of progress. As he put it in *The Promise of American Life* (p. 453), "... the task of individual and social regeneration must remain incomplete and impoverished until the conviction and the feeling of human brotherhood enters the possession of the human spirit."

Between 1909, when this was written, and 1914, when he published his second book of political theory, *Progressive Democracy*, Croly became convinced that such a spiritual transformation had taken place in America. Added to his optimism is an evident reading of the sociological writings of men like Baldwin and Cooley. Croly now seemed certain that social evolution had brought man to a point of complete independence of physical and historical forces; it had made man completely free to follow his new religion and the rational, cooperative nature given him by a culminating social process.

With unbounded enthusiasm he now rejected the whole philosophy of restraint and discipline that had marked his first book;

it was an irrelevancy in the new world mankind had entered, the new world of "Society." Man had completely escaped his bondage to history and society and was free to finish the creation of the cooperative commonwealth. Denying America's obligation to external or historical criteria, he demanded in this later book (p. 154) "... the emancipation of the democracy from continued allegiance to any specific formulation of the Law," and insisted (p. 38) that the best organization of "... political power is not to confine its exercise within the limits defined by certain rules."

Croly was certain that the complete harmony of the new "Society" made impossible any conflict between the individual and society. The people could use the political state without limitations because, since history was transcended, there was no possibility of connecting evil with political behavior. Indeed, because of the tremendous social solidarity engendered by the new religion of humanity, all older political concepts of limited government could be abandoned; checks and balances, even political parties, were irrelevancies where there were no conflicting interests to be represented. As Croly proclaimed in *Progressive Democracy* (p. 311), "Just in so far as a group of really democratic political institutions are created, the foundations of the two-party system are undermined. The two parties seek to accomplish for a democratic electorate certain purposes which such an electorate ought to accomplish for itself."²⁴

Thus the rapidly rising religious enthusiasm of American intellectuals in the years of the twentieth century before World War I, an enthusiasm that found expression in the millennial hope of immediate spiritual salvation within the secular environment, suggests the necessity for fundamental qualifications of the thesis that postulates conversion of these intellectuals to Darwinism. To a significant degree, there appears to have been an

²⁴ For a more complete analysis of Croly's political theory, see a forthcoming article by David W. Noble, "Herbert Croly and American Progressive Thought," in *Western Political Quarterly*.

increasing spiritual orientation among many intellectuals from 1880 onward to 1914.²⁵ Such an occurrence is in almost direct contradiction to the belief that these decades saw the triumph of a detached scientific attitude. As one spokesman for the latter position states the case, it was a slow but certain victory: "Only in the early part of this century did a decided revolt develop against the last defense of the Genteel Tradition expressed in the 'Will to Believe' movement."²⁶ There is evidence, however, that the "Will to Believe" movement was never stronger than at that time.

²⁵ World War I served to disintegrate much of this faith in progress. See David W. Noble, "The New Republic and the Idea of Progress, 1914-1920," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. 38 (December 1951) pp. 387-402.

²⁶ Sidney Ratner (cited above, note 2) p. 121.

GROUPS IN ALEXANDRIA, EGYPT

BY MONA SEDKY

ALEXANDRIA is a unique city inasmuch as it has been historically a point of contact between Europe and the Middle East and has throughout its history been governed more often by foreigners than by the Egyptians on whose land it stands. But it shares many of the characteristics of other Mediterranean cities in that it is a port, a cosmopolitan and polyglot center, and an exchange point for the import and export of goods, persons, and ideas. In this city of almost one million inhabitants over thirty-two foreign nationalities are represented, constituting one-fifth of the city's population, and almost as many tongues are heard. Even the Egyptians, who make up the majority of the population, are derived from all parts of Egypt, many of them from the extreme south of the country; and among Egyptians there is a liberal sprinkling of those of derived nationality, that is, persons who were formerly citizens of neighboring Arabic and Moslem countries, such as Algeria, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon.

In this city a study was made of the types of groups that people form, the relationships existing among them, and the degree of individual participation in groups. Not every type of group was studied, but among those included were organized groups and several unorganized but relatively clearly definable associations. There was some interviewing of a random sample of Egyptian men and women, and group members were consulted as to the relationships among the various groups. The results of this study are here briefly summarized.

I

Group formation in Alexandria appears to follow several major lines of emphasis. The following half-dozen are most outstanding.

In the first place, there are groups of an exclusive ethnic or

regional nature, which stress a high degree of "in-group" feeling, supported by features of indisputable restrictivity such as birth-place, nationality, language, cultural pattern. One finds, for example, such associations as the Greek community, the Italian colony, or, among the Egyptians themselves, the Sons of Menoufia Province, the Sudanese Association, the Nubian Association. These groups have both involuntary and voluntary features. A Nubian, for example, is a "natural" or "involuntary" member of the Nubian community, but he has a choice as to whether or not to join one of the organized Nubian groups such as a club or service agency; similarly, a person born to a family from the Peloponnesus is involuntarily a Greek, but he may or may not participate in the groups sponsored by Peloponnesians.

The multiplicity, and at times the extremely local nature, of these ethnic or regional groups are seen in the fact that the Greek community, comprising over 60,000 members in Alexandria, has formed forty-seven associations, many of them on the basis of locality such as small associations for those Greeks who have come from certain islands or districts of the Greek mainland. Similarly, the Upper Egyptians (from the general area south of Cairo), numbering over 105,000, have formed thirty-one organized groups quite aside from the informal groups centering around cafes; and these thirty-one groups are almost entirely subdivided into small associations based on the region or town of origin in Upper Egypt.

A second category is formed by the religious groups, which cut across the in-group lines of regional or national character. The Moslems account for nearly 762,000 out of the population of 919,000, and the other major religions, Christianity (with its sects) and Judaism, are also represented. These have not only their appropriate institutions and establishments but also large numbers of religiously oriented groups, often with a service function, which have a strong appeal to individuals. In some instances the religious group is also a religious-ethnic group; there are, for example, Syrian-Catholic and Syrian-Orthodox groups, or Greek-Orthodox and Russian-Orthodox.

Third are the occupational groups, either organized or unorganized. The unorganized occupational groups, frequently found among craftsmen and skilled workmen, seem to present features of a guild nature, for they include such functions as employment placement, trade-training and apprenticeship, the furtherance of social and economic security by means of mutual assistance and death benefits, the provision of social-recreational outlets. These occupational groups are often built up along family, regional, or national lines, and in some instances have their own mores, modes of dress, and manner of speech. The Middle Eastern tradition of handing down crafts and skills from father to son and of apprenticing young boys lends strength to the formation of such occupational groups as those of the pilots in Alexandria harbor, the butchers, the chair-caners. The organized, and more modern, groups with occupational interests, such as those participating in the Federation of Egyptian Industries in its various "chambers" for the oil industry, the hotel industry, the rice mills, and the like, can more correctly be termed functional groups for furthering the interests of the various industries, rather than occupational groups.

The fourth type is the family groups, which in their influence and activity extend into spheres beyond domestic matters. Trade-training, education, selection of a profession or occupation, and other matters affecting the economic life of an individual are greatly influenced by the family. The individual's choice of mate and place of residence are also strongly influenced, if not actually decided, by the family. The family still remains the most reliable source of help, the most stable guarantee of security, and the most immediate granter of status. Lack of emigration and restricted mobility even within the country tend to strengthen this reliance on the family, for family relationships, even where they are not warmly congenial, are practically unavoidable and must therefore be reckoned with and accommodated.

The expanded-family institution of *baladeyatna* seemingly shares most if not all of the features of the family group itself. A

fellow villager or an individual from one's own locality is usually given the same types of security, service, hospitality as would be given a family member. In many cases intermarriages between villagers and marriages to cousins are so complicated that a fellow villager is very likely to be a relative in some degree. The group relationships between actual family members and those between *baladeyatna* differ only in degree, not in kind.

Fifth are the friendship groups, which seem to spring up between occupational colleagues, between relatives of various degrees further removed than the immediate family, between the "in-laws" who have married into the family, and between old school-mates. When married couples share in friendship groups there is likely to be an underlying family relationship; there may be, for example, two sisters and their husbands, or two brothers and their wives. This is less true, however, in the higher levels of the educational and economic scale; there friendship groups that include couples are apparently more likely to be based on the occupational interest of the husbands, and family ties are not so important.

There are rarely any organized activities in the friendship groups, although various social games such as cards may be engaged in. Among men such groups often revolve around several cafes, or may even be centered in one cafe. They may include regular devotees of card games, chess, backgammon (*tawla*), or they may be gossip groups or groups with a common subject of conversation, such as shop talk. The friendship groups are characteristically not action-oriented; they provide status, a feeling of belonging, and a congenial way of spending leisure time, but they do not offer outlets for constructive participation in purposeful activity.

Finally, there are the functional groups, which include all those that are organized to further certain interests and aims shared by their members. Some functional groups, such as labor unions, professional associations, or associations of manufacturers, are based on occupational and economic interests; others may be

given over to cultural pursuits, or to satisfying the desire to be of service to the community, or to any of many other purposes. It appears that individual participation in groups of this sort is more limited than might be expected in a city of Alexandria's size and character.

Of the functional groups, those organized to provide service to others apparently play, however, a valid and relatively important role in the community life. They seem to be the most active of the functional groups, especially those of them that have an in-group basis, although Alexandria is also notable for its service agencies of an intergroup character. The service organizations accomplish their community role by several means: by giving individuals an outlet for their need for group activity; by providing an opportunity for achieving status, both in the group and in the community; by fostering among the group members a feeling of participation in community life which they might not otherwise find; by serving as a means of fostering solidarity in in-groups, when the service society is restricted to a certain client-group or a certain member-group; by providing a means of contact between those from the higher income level and those from the lower income level; by offering at least temporary assistance and relief to the needy until the government can take on a larger share of the responsibility; by providing a common objective, with many diverse groups agreeing about its worth and cooperating in achieving it, however they may differ in religious, national, lingual, or other characteristics.

Functional groups intended to give the individual an opportunity to serve a special interest or to participate in areas essential to his life—such as parent-teachers associations, consumer leagues, hobby groups, and the like—are largely nonexistent, and the few that are found are certainly not participated in by the great majority of the population. On the other hand, there are several indications of an awakening interest in functional groups, more especially in those of a recreational nature, and of a governmental awareness of the importance of opportunities for group experi-

ence among Egyptian youth. Thus such developments as training group leaders, holding summer camps, opening youth hostels are being encouraged, and facilities are being provided for them.

The relationships among groups are more generally found to be based on a tolerant indifference than on either active cooperation or hostile competition. But intergroup relationships, especially those between the foreign ethnic groups and the Egyptians, seem likely to become more cooperative in the future, if prediction can reliably be made on the basis of present trends. These trends include such developments as the present economic cooperation, recent legislative and interpretive action regarding the assimilation of foreigners, recent regulations concerning investment of foreign capital and property ownership by non-Egyptians, the spread of the Arabic language in European schools, the requirement of Arabic in commercial and other transactions, the increasing knowledge of European languages by Egyptians, and, very significantly, recent political policy and declarations.

As for the incidence of individual participation in group activities, the available information must be considered with some reserve; on the one hand, individuals interviewed had difficulty in defining or recognizing the group they belong to, other than organized groups, and on the other hand, there was a reluctance to reveal membership in some groups because of their secret or political nature. With these reservations, the material elicited from individuals indicates that not many persons take part in group activities other than purely family-group affairs. The limited participation that does exist is likely to be with a friendship group in a cafe, and it should be noted that such a group is characteristically not action-oriented. Participation in organized groups is largely restricted to recreational activities or to mutual-benefit, security-centered association with co-religionists or fellow regionalists. Participation in functional groups, as mentioned above, is very limited, and appears to be concentrated among relatively few citizens each of whom participates in several such groups.

II

The types of groups formed in Alexandria reflect the character of the city itself in its various manifestations. Some of these factors that influence the types of groups formed are worth special mention, though here they can be only briefly listed.

One important factor is the markedly heterogeneous population of Alexandria, with its many ethnic, regional, and religious differences. This heterogeneity makes it difficult to reach a common ground on which individuals from markedly different cultures could agree and upon which they could affiliate equally. Thus they tend to separate off into groups on the basis of their differentiating features.

A second influencing factor is the variety of occupational interests found in the city. Alexandria is a port with commercial and communications interests; it is a transportation terminal through which different peoples, ideas, and goods enter and leave the country. It has active commercial interests based on the import-export trade and on finance. It is an important industrial center both for processing local raw materials and for the processing of imported materials; it also borders on an important agricultural area from which much of its raw material and many of its residents pour into the city. Alexandria attracts people—workers, buyers, sellers—from all other sections of the country. These diverse and often specialized occupational interests tend to concentrate people in groups focused on certain trades or economic activities—a concentration that may even be manifested geographically in the residential quarters of different occupational groups. The tendency to concentrate around certain occupational interests is strengthened by the very old pattern of family and extended-family skills and crafts.

Another factor in group formation is the great differences on the social-economic scale between the very rich and the very poor. These differences, manifesting themselves in every area of life—education, standards of health and cleanliness, district of residence, mode of dress—are so extreme as to leave no common

ground for association. People tend to associate with their social-economic equals, and to form groups along those lines, just as they do with regard to the ethnic-religious-regional factors.

The restricted mobility on the economic, occupational, and class scales is another factor to be considered. Until the past few years the Egyptian educational system has tended to solidify this immobility among Egyptians by providing one stream of educational opportunity for the rich and another for the poor. Instances in which an individual has risen from poverty to riches are so uncommon as to be rarities, although World War II opened opportunities in black-marketing and profiteering which permitted an upward movement for a few, at least on the economic scale. In general, however, mobility on the economic, occupational, and class scales is still very limited, and people tend to associate with their fellows in their own social-economic range.

Also important in group formation is the incomplete development of national, all-inclusive systems for social security and economic opportunity. The most widespread governmental scheme yet attempted, the Social Security System undertaken in 1950, was categorical in application and contained many highly restrictive clauses, with the result that large sections of the population, especially non-Egyptians, were not included. This program, although nationwide in its conception, never actually covered the nation geographically before its conversion into another type of social assistance, and at its best it did not aim at caring for all types of need. Therefore people have had no opportunity to observe in action a government-sponsored, all-inclusive social security scheme by which they could be convinced that a stable source of security underlies the community. Until such nationally sponsored social security exists, people must continue to rely on their primary family groups or their wider in-groups for security. This leads to a multiplication of groups that aim at providing help when needed on a national, religious, regional, or even occupational basis, largely with exclusive mutual-help features.

There is also the city's history of inconsistent and varying treatment as between the different ethnic, economic, religious, and other groups, with no long-term, organized effort toward assimilation into the community life. Under various foreign rules one religion or one nationality, one family or group of families would be preferred over others; with changes in political power these preferences also changed, with the result that the several groups were subjected to varying kinds of policy ranging from preferential to discriminatory treatment. In the face of this past inconsistency the groups withdrew even more into themselves, especially those formed along ethnic and religious lines. It is only within very recent years that the slogan "we are all Egyptians" has been promulgated, and that Egyptian citizenship could be obtained by any reasonable procedure; before this time the psychological barriers between groups appeared even higher than at present.

A further factor is the recognized urban character of the tendency toward group formation, especially in regard to interest groups of a functional nature. The formation of such groups, undertaken in order to provide united and shared effort toward accomplishing the common goal, offers the individual an alternative to the frustration that usually results from his unaided pursuit of a goal. The appearance of such groups as labor unions and specialized service societies is a distinctly urban phenomenon; indeed, they would be largely superfluous in a rural community.

Also to be considered is the phenomenon of a mosaic-patterned society, which has been described as characteristic of the Middle East. In this patterning, groups are differentiated from one another by occupation, craft, skill, and the like, by custom, perhaps by residential section, by family ties. The various groups resulting from this differentiation fit into a mosaic pattern, each group tolerating and respecting the peculiar individuality of the others.

Finally, there are the strong family ties, which, when broadened to the extended-family concept, include the *baladayatna* or fellow villager, the individual who comes from one's own district or

home town. This family and extended-family tie is reflected in groupings which influence the forms of mutual assistance and influence the individual in his undertaking of an occupational pursuit, his selection of a mate, his means of gaining status, and other such concerns.

The foregoing are some of the factors that tend to lead people in Alexandria to form the types of groups they do form. Some of these factors, but by no means all of them, seem to be more or less characteristic of Alexandria as a Mediterranean city, an Egyptian city, and an international city; some of them could be equally true of other cities of the size of Alexandria with similar circumstances.

Among the phenomena observed during this study, the one most worthy of comment is the absence of opportunity for developing a participant citizenry. This opportunity cannot be created by law or declared as a policy; it can be built up only over a period of time, by the encouragement of all sorts of socially constructive group activities among all age groups, between both sexes, in all social-economic gradations, and in various sections of the population. Only by practicing active participation and decision-making in groups that they find congenial with their interests can individuals gain experience which will prepare them for taking responsibility and sharing intelligently in wider community life. This practice and experience must be begun early and developed up through the differentiating interests of adulthood in order to prepare a responsible citizenry for political life and for an interested constructive and contributing role in the community.

HEIDEGGER'S NEW CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY

The Second Phase of "Existentialism"

BY WERNER MARX

"**W**HERE are the days of Tobias," Rainer Maria Rilke asks sorrowfully in the *Second Duino Elegy*. Are those days forever gone, the poet wonders, when man was blessed with the immediacy and simplicity of speech that were the mark of Tobias, the simple one? Can we latecomers in a long cultural process ever hope to find our way back to such an immediacy and simplicity and thereby become again truly creative, or as the Greeks said *poietic*?

I

Mankind does remember a time when, in and through such an immediate saying and singing, the whole of a meaningful order arose out of the darkness that had shrouded all-that-is. In and through the mythical song the great and terrifying powers that formed and ruled the cosmos came to light and shone forth—in the brilliance of the beautiful and in the terror of the numinous. The *Philomythoi*, as Aristotle calls them in the first book of the *Metaphysics*, sang meaningfully of the deeds of the gods, and thereby helped to create an image of the divinities; thus the shepherd might realize the divine presence as he drove his flock out at daybreak, and the peasant might remember the gods as he plowed his fields, as might the hunter and the fisherman during their "works and days." And Aristotle tells us how the *Philomythoi* sang in awe and wonder, feeling themselves the servants, instruments, and voices of the powers about which they sang.

As darkness receded still more, and on the Ionian shores man began to think—to think of and toward that which enables, em-

powers, forms all-that-is, of and toward the order, the logos of the cosmos—then also such thinking was simple, immediate, and creative. And these thinkers too felt themselves to be servants, instruments, and voices, particularly of that power they served most, *nous*, light-giving Reason. Blessed with the gift of *nous*, they were gifted for *noesis*, the capacity to apprehend intuitively and thereby to bring the meaning of Reason into the fullness of its light. Through such elucidations the cosmos became more lucid. The pre-Socratics did not, however, try to elucidate the various meanings of all the many "particular beings." Rather, they tried most of all to conceive, which then meant to "mirror," the phenomenal elementary powers—the elements of water, fire, air, and earth—and to let emerge that which held all these elements together and empowered them: *physis*, the natureness in all these natures.

Physis, that great unifying mother, was also conceived as *Eon* or "to *einai*," Being or "to be," for the way *physis* unfolds itself was seen as the way Being unfolds itself, the way Being allows the *physei onta*, the natural beings, to "be" or "not be"—makes them a-light into the light of their presence and then pass again into the darkness of their past. In their "philosophizing poems" the pre-Socratics elucidated a certain character of Being. They composed and articulated poetically a certain "Essence of Being" by differentiating Being from Non-Being, by differentiating Being from or identifying it with Becoming, by setting Being-in-Truth over against Being-in-Sham. And at one with the "Essence of Being" the "Essence of Man" was poetically composed as that natural being that can think the Essence of Being.

Today, partly because of the work of that distinguished scholar the late Kurt Riezler, we can better understand the character of philosophizing, the self-understanding of the philosopher, and the task of philosophy during pre-Socratic times. When we say of any particular thing that "it is" or "is not," that "it is" or is only "becoming," that it "is true, genuine" or only "sham," or when we say that man is "in truth" or "in error," many scholars

are convinced that, despite the many variations played on these themes in the history of philosophy, we are still thinking under the influence of the first conception of the "Essence of Being and of Man" as poetically composed by those first thinkers. In this sense the pre-Socratics may be said to have set "a beginning": it was the "first beginning," occurring at the dawn of mankind.

I wish to suggest here that the ultimate aim of Martin Heidegger's "new conception of philosophy" during this present, his second phase, is to attain a "second beginning" at this late stage of human development. His efforts, which leave so many people bewildered, must be seen, I submit, as composing anew toward the "Essence of Being" and, at one with that, as articulating anew "the Essence of Man."

This means not that Heidegger tries to imitate the pre-Socratics but that he wants—or as he would presumably express it, is forced—to attain the same effect that the pre-Socratic composition of the "Essence of Being" might have had; that for this reason he tries to articulate anew the Essence of all-that-is and thus also the Essence of Man.

It is therefore not surprising to find, on analyzing the writings of Heidegger's second phase, that his "new conception of philosophy" seems to demand that the "self-understanding" of the philosopher be changed to the kind of self-understanding which the Philomythoi and pre-Socratics seem to have had; that the new philosopher feel himself again as intermediary, instrument, and voice; and that the "style or character of philosophizing" again become simple, immediate, and poetic like the singing and thinking of the Philomythoi and the pre-Socratics. And finally, Heidegger—again as the first thinkers did—now sees the foremost "task or subject matter of philosophy" not as the explanation of the meaning of "particular beings" but as the elucidation, articulation, and poetic composition of a new "Essence of Being," and thereby of a new "Essence of Man."

Martin Heidegger thus seems to assume not only that mankind can find its way back to the days of Tobias but also that the

Essence of all-that-is, and thereby the Essence of Man, can and must be articulated anew, by a "new conception of philosophy."

I wish to emphasize immediately that Heidegger has not made these aims explicit; nor has he ever thus formulated his "new conception of philosophy." This paper has set itself the task of interpreting his writings in order to bring out their guiding aims and conception. Following the method that Heidegger has himself employed when interpreting other philosophers, it will proceed one step behind him, observing what he does and how he does it in the hope that thereby may emerge what has remained so far unexpressed in Heidegger's works.

This can be considered a worthwhile task, for practically no interpretation of Heidegger's second phase exists. Perhaps the primary reason for this lack is the fact that Heidegger's exposition has become even stranger than during his first phase. In the main he now merely alludes to his aims, and he often speaks in metaphors which his critics have alternately called dark, mystifying, and nonsensical and which his admirers repeat enchantedly and believingly as if they contained the gospel truth. Therefore it is needless to emphasize that what to the uninitiated might appear a "mere account" of Heidegger's works constitutes a formidable task of interpretation, particularly if undertaken in an attitude that soberly wants to establish what he actually aims at and intends. Before a critical evaluation of Heidegger's second phase can be presented, the task of adequate interpretation has first to be solved. In this paper, therefore, I shall confine my critical remarks to fundamental observations at decisive junctures. But such restraint, necessary for any unbiased interpretation of a dark and difficult author, should not be construed as an indication that this interpreter is in full accord with the position developed.

It might be questioned why I have undertaken to discuss here this controversial philosopher who is not yet understood even in his home country. But if it is true that Heidegger aims at a "second beginning," in the sense I have described, and if we assume that a philosophical conception of the "Essence of Being

and of Man" actually has a bearing on all levels of life in a given era, then Heidegger's efforts are not just another academic construction but are serious business concerning everybody, everywhere.

The political problem remains. Heidegger has still neither explained nor attempted to justify his affiliation with the Nazi regime in Germany. And if he were to be judged on political grounds his actions in that respect could not be condoned. My concern here, however, is with Heidegger as a philosopher, and I believe there are many who would agree that as such he must be given serious consideration, despite his execrable political affiliations.

Even so, Heidegger's "new conception of philosophy" cannot be expected to meet with much understanding on the part of those who are certain that philosophy can be nothing more than a handmaiden to the natural sciences, nor can it evoke much sympathy from those for whom philosophy itself is a "science," be it even in the sense understood by Husserl. My brief emphasis above on the point that the pre-Socratics were not "scientific" was also intended as an indication of the climate in which one must be prepared to live if one is really to understand Heidegger. Naturally, it is next to impossible to convey in English the poetic character of many of his expressions, let alone their double or triple connotations.

I still need to explain why I speak of a "second phase of existentialism." It should be said at once that I use the word "existentialism" simply for want of any better. Especially in this country Heidegger is lumped with Jaspers and Sartre as an exponent of "existentialism." It is true that these three share certain traits inherited from Kierkegaard, but in general they are very far apart. Specifically, the term "existence" means something different for each of them.

I speak of a second "phase" of existentialism in spite of the fact that most of Heidegger's critics are of the opinion that there is such a decisive break between the early and the late period of

Heidegger's works that one should even speak of two Heideggers, the one contradicting the other.¹ There is a dual reason why I prefer to speak of two phases of one development.

In the first place, I am convinced that there is much of the "new conception of philosophy" implicit in the results of the first period. Heidegger himself has never clearly spelled out these implications, but has left the reader to reconstruct for himself the transference from the first to the second period. In the following pages I shall briefly refer to my own attempts at reconstruction lest the "new conception" of the second phase appear to have sprung from the head of Zeus and need not be taken seriously.

In supporting my second consideration for speaking about two "phases" I submit that to appreciate the full significance of Heidegger's thinking in either period one must see both periods in their polemical character. Almost every one of Heidegger's positive statements or compositions has a negative or antagonistic side, for they are all born out of his life-and-death struggle with his archenemy Cartesianism. Although Heidegger does not tell us so, I see his new conception of philosophy as his final triumph over Descartes, the end of a long struggle beginning in the works of his first period and ending in those of the second. Because of this second justification for speaking of two "phases" I shall now depict against the background of Descartes' philosophy the development that culminated in Heidegger's new conception.

II

Since it is now in vogue to discuss the influence of Descartes I need not enter into a great many details but may merely emphasize briefly that René Descartes bifurcated the Essence of Being. He tore the whole and sound tissue of reality asunder, isolating two spheres by a deep gulf.

On one side of that abyss he posited man, whose Essence he conceived as the self-proved, indubitably given center of mind or

¹ See, for example, Karl Löwith, *Heidegger Denker in dürftiger Zeit* (Frankfurt a/M 1953).

consciousness, the *ego cogitans*. This merely mental entity was also characterized by him as a "thing"—a thinking thing—as a "substance," and as a "subject." It was a subject because it had the power to "represent to itself" as "object" the reality posited on the other side of the gulf. The specific method of "representing" an "object" was the new mathematical-physical, quantitative science, fit only to measure rigid and fixed attributes. In the light of this science the essence of the second sphere was conceived as a "non-conscious, non-mental, merely bodily extended thing," robbed of all its qualitative richness and shades.

There is no need here to discuss how Descartes' conception of the Essence of Man as a self-certain thing, with its faculty of consciousness, not only influenced academic philosophy but seems to have had a bearing on commonsense levels of human self-interpretation. Nor shall I deal with the consequences arising from the reification of the "non"-conscious reality, a reification that soon began to influence the interpretation of the "conscious" reality. I need not develop the consequences of the Cartesian gulf, with its subject-object dichotomy, its split of psyche from *physis*, spirit from nature, except to emphasize that this split tore man out of a teleologically or divinely ordered cosmos or World. It is not necessary, finally, to show the implications of Descartes' claim that only a particular kind of knowledge, the mathematical-physical method, provides a relevant access to the reality of the universe. Some observers—particularly in view of the stupendous successes of the natural sciences—feel that all these consequences have been beneficial. But most deplore them, on the whole—though even they often overlook that the much lamented self-interpretation of modern man or the ever increasing reification of all-that-is may have some connection with Descartes' fundamental conception of the Essence of Being and of Man; and have those philosophers who have indeed seen herein the basic principle of modern times, and deplored it, done enough about it?

No doubt Husserl's magnificent efforts to describe the constitutive synthesis of transcendental subjectivity, developing particu-

larly the notion of "intentionality," have done a great deal to overcome the consequences of Cartesianism in academic philosophy. Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartman, the neo-Thomists, such philosophers of the Anglo-Saxon world as Whitehead—as well as those who would revive classical philosophy—all aim expressly or implicitly toward the same goal. So too does Jaspers, though not on the level of knowledge, since for him Being stands, to use Kant's words, in the "space of the unknowable": neither the Essence of Being nor that of Man can be known; they can be elucidated or realized only through transcending movements. But have all these philosophers gone about their objective radically enough, that is, have they tried to tear up the very roots of Descartes' conception of the Essence of Being and the Essence of Man?

To repeat, it is my contention that most of Heidegger's effort should be interpreted in this light, and that other motifs are of secondary importance. Emphasizing this negative or antagonistic point of view, I would summarize the results of his first period's works in this way: Heidegger demonstrated that the Essence of Man is not mainly that of a self-proved center of mind or consciousness, is not a thinking "thing," "substance," or "subject," and is not separated by a Cartesian gulf from a non-conscious reality.

Heidegger underscored the factuality (*Faktizität*) of the human reality—the brute fact that man "is," is "here and now," just as the rest of the universe "is," that man, in this sense, is a be-ing among a multitude of be-ings. Man's allegedly merely mental cogitating ways are also, basically, articulations of this factuality; even "thinking" cannot be dissolved into a pure faculty of consciousness. Kierkegaard, in the *Unscientific Postscript*, had used the concept "existence" when describing the so-called "ethical relationship" of the I toward its Me. He should have used the concept "essence" as the one traditionally referred to in any description of the "what" of a particular phenomenon. But he preferred the term "existence," traditionally reserved to

conceive the "mere that" of a phenomenon, because he wanted to emphasize the almost factual character of this relationship. Heidegger, taking this clue from Kierkegaard, likewise uses the concept "existence" instead of "essence," and does so particularly in order to emphasize again that man's Essence must be understood as a non-conceptual articulation of a factuality, as an explanation of "ways to be" rather than of Cartesian merely mental cogitations.

Influenced by the philosophers of "Life," especially by Max Scheler and Edmund Husserl, Heidegger demonstrated next that these "existing ways" do not have the character of Cartesian "things" or "substances." They show a specific movement expressive of man's concern with his existing acts as his own possibilities. In what way such concern or "care" constitutes itself by and in a specific kind of Time need not be elaborated here. For an understanding of Heidegger's "conception of philosophy during his second phase" it is important, however, to see the reason why such an insistence on the unique character underlying the movement of the human ways did not lead Heidegger back to the Cartesian conception of a bifurcated reality.

The many intricate analyses in the book *Sein und Zeit* overshadow one basic insight which, in my opinion, underlies all the rest: the insight into the fact, the awe-inspiring fact; that man is not only a "being" like all the other beings of the universe, not only "is," but is so constituted that through most of his acts he stands in some awareness of "that and how he is," "that and how" all the other human and nonhuman beings "are"—stands in some awareness that they are be-ings. So closely is man interwoven with all-that-is that even the "sense" of the ways of his be-ing and of other be-ings is intimately and immediately disclosed to him. Or to express it in classical terminology—in the terminology used, as I have mentioned, by the pre-Socratics—almost every one of man's acts is an act in some awareness of the Essence of "Being," written with a capital B and to be differentiated from a "particular being" written with a small letter, the

one determining the other. Man is so constituted that he is open not only for his own Being—the character and meanings of his own existing ways or, as we might put it briefly, his “constitution”—but also for Being in its character and meanings of other human and nonhuman “particular beings.” Thus his very uniqueness ties him so intimately to the reality of all-that-is that the conception of a Cartesian separation seems wrong.

Heidegger developed at length the constitutive forces or “transcendental conditions of possibility” that bring about man’s mysterious closeness to the Essence of Being. I shall briefly develop two of these forces because, unlike other interpreters, I find in them the true source of Heidegger’s new conception of philosophy. For the sake of brevity and exactness these explanations must, unfortunately, be given in highly technical terms.

In the sixth book of the *Nichomachean Ethics* and in the ninth book of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle explained how certain basic human acts unconceal the Truth of Being. These truth-discovering efforts on the part of man, this *aletheuein*, presupposes, in a sense, Truth, *aletheia*, conceived in this context as a state of manifestness or overtness within which this activity acts. It also presupposes *nous*, Reason, the Light that makes the cosmos self-transparent and intelligible.

I believe that Heidegger was greatly influenced by Aristotle’s notion of the truth-discovering ways of man, by this version of Truth and of *nous*, when he developed how the transcendental human reality breaks itself open. In and through its basic “existing ways,” the so-called “existentials”—through understanding, moods (*Gestimmtheit*), and speech—it discloses or illuminates “itself.” In and through these ways-to-be that strange lucidity is brought about in the realm we now commonly call our “consciousness”—a name that Heidegger avoids not only, as may be assumed, because of its Cartesian implications but because it prevents us from realizing that each individual lucidity or overtness is part and parcel of a wide and general overtness, of an elementary sort of Truth or *aletheia*.

It is true that our everyday ways of understanding, always tuned by mood, and our everyday ways of speaking are usually dissipated and bring about only a concealed kind of Truth or Untruth. But Heidegger's critics—concentrating on his often rather strange analyses of everyday ways of interpretation and mistaking their purpose as sociological, anthropological, or "ethical"—have overlooked the fact that the "existentials," even in their everyday mode, disclose man's transcendental constitution and bring about some state of lucidity and overtness. Therefore it has not been sufficiently recognized, in this interpreter's opinion, that Heidegger, even in his first phase, insisted on this overtness as an *a priori*, as a prior condition for any so-called subject-object relationships. No subject could refer itself to an object, no act of experiential knowledge about an object could take place, and no statement or judgment could be arrived at about an object, if such a prior state of manifestness had not come about, embracing both subject and object. Heidegger thus developed, even in his first phase, the notion of "overtness" as one of the "conditions of possibility" for the basic phenomenal fact that "man finds himself at all times together with others and together with his things."

A second way of explaining the same phenomenon is the notion of "world," not to be identified with the Kantian "idea" of world that Jaspers uses. Heidegger—undoubtedly greatly influenced by the insights that Husserl had in the later years of his life regarding the so-called "primordial world" and "prepredicative sphere"—enunciates world as that which constitutes the unity of significances, the context of meanings in which man moves. In the final chapters of *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger developed how world "temporalizes" itself as a horizontal scheme of interrelating references. It constitutes itself, in a sense independent of but yet together with the human reality.

Man is conceived by Heidegger as closely tied in with world. By means of his basic existing acts, "understanding, mood, and speech," he is always "in" world. Man refers to this context of intersubjective meanings and is referred by them, because he is

always already within-amidst them—moves around in them with ease and familiarity. He interprets his particular situation into which fate has cast him not as a senseless contingent fact but as a meaningful part of his world. Man projects, charts his own course for pragmatic reasons, but does so within this context of meanings and always guided by it. In this sense he is determined by it, and therefore, on this ground alone, it is quite wrong to assert that Heidegger has conceived of man as "sovereign" or as a self-creator, in the way Sartre does. It is true that the world of which Heidegger speaks is not a teleologically or divinely ordered cosmos of immutable Essences. But it should be recognized that even in his first phase Heidegger overcame Cartesianism in so far as he developed man as a being that by its very constitution dwells "in" a cosmos or world.

Thus the two notions of "overtness" and "world" constitute man as an entity that stands in an intimate and immediate awareness of Being in its character and meanings.²

III

I would argue that even in his first phase Heidegger overcame Cartesianism to a significant degree. But at least one Cartesian feature remained: the Essence of Being in its character and meanings was developed only through an enunciation of the constitution of man. Though in *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger already saw that the overtness which the unconcealing acts produce is part and parcel of a wider realm of overtness, he conceived this overtness as an "existential"—saw it from the point of view of the human constitution. And though in *Sein und Zeit* he already held, as in the essay *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, that world temporalizes itself, he anchored world in transcendental acts of the human reality, and thus developed world, too, from the point of view of

² For an analysis of other aspects of Heidegger's first phase see the masterful essay by Karl Löwith, "Heidegger: Problem and Background of Existentialism," in *Social Research*, vol. 15 (September 1948) pp. 345-69. Löwith's more recent publication (cited above, note 1) is a more critical review, particularly of Heidegger's later works.

the human constitution. I surmise that it must have occurred to Heidegger, when he broke off the efforts of his first period, that the Cartesian conception, and particularly its consequences, might be overcome only if he would abandon this point of view and develop the constitution of man as inherent in the "Essence of Being."

It may be noted that Jaspers, in his second phase, tries to overcome the anthropocentric emphasis of his first phase by demonstrating that the human reality is embraced by the all-encompassing Being; and that Sartre, who chronologically belongs to the second phase of existentialism, likewise emphasizes how Being-as-such, the *En-soi*, breaks into the human sphere.

In *Brief über den Humanismus*, published twenty years after the appearance of *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger presents us with formulations, mostly in metaphorical language, that are judged by his critics to be dark, mystifying, and entirely irreconcilable with the statements of his first period. We are here particularly interested in those formulations that are implied, according to Heidegger, in the German word *Dasein*, because his "new conception of philosophy" rests on them. Heidegger had used this notion also during his first phase, and had used it with varying meanings, but only to describe the human constitution. Without advising his readers of a change of usage, he now emphasizes the literal meaning of the word *Dasein*—the "Here and There of Being." This "Here and There," *Da*, is conceived as the spot where "Being," *Sein*, breaks itself open, producing a clearance within a state of darkness, secrecy, mystery, and error—an island of light. This "spot of Being" is also called the "overtness of Being" or "the truth of Being" or the "world of Being"—all notions which in the works of the first phase had been used to explicate the "constitution of man."

It seems on first sight as if Heidegger were no longer concerned with enunciating the constitution of man. In the same essay, however, he states that man is essentially this *Da*, this "Here and There of Being," inasmuch as man dwells in this *Da* or "stands

out into" this clearance of Being; such "standing out into" is again called to "eksist," but now written in Greek instead of Latin, where it has this meaning. The former "existentials" or basic ways-to-be—"understanding, mood, and speech"—are the ways through which this "standing out into" occurs, and now they are called "ways of Being."

In the light of my own scheme of interpretation I would argue that these statements represent Heidegger's final triumph over Cartesianism, because they try to articulate the constitution of man as inherent in the Essence of Being. And they also appear to me, basically, as reformulations of the implications of his first phase, though certain characteristics of overtness and world are difficult to reconcile.

I repeat that Heidegger had developed "overtness" and "world" as the "transcendental conditions or forces" bringing about the human constitution. It has not been recognized that these conditions, in themselves, are of an entirely nonhuman character. Nor has it been seen that Heidegger now calls these ultimate enabling forces "the Essence of Man." I shall presently discuss the significance of Heidegger's notion of "Essence" as the "enabling power." In this context it is sufficient to emphasize that the notion "Essence of Man" does not have any "anthropological" significance for him. Consequently one should not expect to receive any insights into anthropology from Heidegger's formulations in his second phase, any more than one should have looked for sociological or ethical insights when studying the works of his first phase. The formulations represent, in this interpreter's opinion, a "speculative conception of reality," of the Essence of Being and of Man—a "speculative conception" of the kind that underlies all particular philosophical systems, scientific endeavors, and commonsense acting.

If "overtness" and "world" have no anthropological significance it does not seem so strange that Heidegger reformulates them as overtness (*Da*) of "Being" (*Sein*) and as world of "Being." Nor is it surprising that he considers "understanding, moods, and

speech," which are essential for the occurrence of overtness and world, as ways of "Being"—though he sees in this occurrence at the same time the "Essence of Man." Heidegger wishes to bring out that the *Da* of man occurs as the *Da* of Being. Or—to express this speculative conception in the form of an image—Being has, as it were, opened itself up. As its opening it has constituted man. The Essence of Man is thus expressed as inherent in the Essence of Being.

It should be seen that this reformulation, while it radically precludes a conception of man in Cartesian subjective-anthropocentric terms, does not rob man of his entire status or let him disappear into a mysterious Essence of Being. In fact, it raises him to a new and high level of dignity. Precisely because the *Da* of man is nothing but the *Da* of Being it follows that man is not only an occurrence of Being but also the open spot—the chosen spot where Being in its character and meanings comes to light. Only if and when overtness and world occur can all-that-is and particular beings be encountered as "be-ings"—only then does the miracle happen that the sense, the meaning, the nature of all-that-is and of particular phenomena can be realized. Only then, in short, can Being "present itself."

And the way that Being presents itself—*west an*—is immediate and direct, because Being is conceived as arriving "directly in its own opening"—in its *Da*, which is also the *Da* of man. I believe that through emphasizing the identity of the *Da* of Being and of man, Heidegger wishes to bring out that Being is not a Cartesian object which must first be represented to the inwardness of a Cartesian subject. Understanding, mood, and speech are, as ways of Being, "necessary" for the operation of overtness and world.

In the works of his first phase Heidegger explained at great length how man can gain a high degree of lucidity and thereby experience his true Being, that of others and of his things—can become what Heidegger then called "authentic." It should be noted that Heidegger's formulations of the second phase do not

make any attempt to explain why man in his everyday life fails to realize that his moods, understanding, and speech are "necessary ways of Being." Such realization now seems possible only in a specific kind of mood, speech, and understanding—in the thinking of the philosopher. And just as for Aristotle it was only the philosopher who could fully understand the *ergon anthroponon*, the human task, and feel committed to it, so for Heidegger, in the second phase, it is the philosopher, or better the "thinker," who will realize the implications of *Dasein*. He will realize that his thinking is a "way of Being," that the Essence of Being unfolds itself in it, and that he is therefore a necessary instrument—that he is needed for the articulation of the Essence of Being.

It can easily be seen that these implications of *Dasein* radically change the role of the philosopher and the significance that philosophy has had and will have for mankind. In and through the thinking of the few true thinkers who have appeared and may appear during a given era, Being in its character and meanings has come and will come to conception.

Heidegger asserts, however, that the philosophers of the past two millennia could not realize themselves according to this notion of *Dasein*. Even Aristotle, when asking the question what is "a particular being qua being"—*ens qua ens*—did so not so much to enunciate the Essence of Being as to explain the "particular beings" in the light of their Beingness, their substantiality; and all philosophers that followed Aristotle were guided by the same attitude, Heidegger holds, and therefore concentrated on explaining "particular beings" even if they did think of the "Essence of Being." From this point of view Heidegger considers all of them to belong to the Aristotelian kind of "metaphysics."

I cannot here discuss how, according to Heidegger, the Essence of Being has nevertheless manifested itself in a "concealed" form in the history of philosophy—how through a changing notion of time it has constituted itself in different ways, determining the thinking of the philosophers. This is a development that he sees eschatologically predetermined in the conception of the first be-

ginning coming to its fulfilment in our times, an era that, according to Heidegger, witnesses simultaneously the end of metaphysics and the beginning of a new and direct approach to the "Essence of Being." Because of this history of Being, which is for Heidegger man's true history, philosophers could not hitherto realize themselves as *Dasein* and consequently did not concentrate their thinking on the articulation of the "Essence of Being" for the sake of "Being" alone.

Thus Heidegger does not consider it to his personal merit that he gave up the Aristotelian-metaphysical approach and came to the realization of *Dasein* and of the new and true task of philosophy. In fact, a mood over which he obviously had no control, a mood of dread, brought him face to face with that miracle of all miracles, that "there is Being rather than Nothing." Dread, "a way of Being," thus forced him to philosophize about the Essence of Being, and thereby forced him—as he would presumably argue if he accepted this conclusion—to try to attain a "second beginning" for mankind.

IV

But what is the "character" of this new philosophizing? Heidegger calls it *andenken*, which means a thinking toward and of, and in this sense a "remembering" kind of thinking. But toward what and of what? What is the subject matter of this kind of thinking?

It should think toward and of the Essence of Being, to which it "belongs," because thinking is a way of Being and through thinking Being presents itself. As Heidegger now formulates it, "Being commands and directs the thinker," or "Being claims the thinking of the thinker so that it thereby may unconceal itself in its truth." The meaning of these formulations must remain entirely dark unless one recognizes Heidegger's particular conception of speech and language, and also understands how Heidegger, in discussing the relationship of thinking to Being, composes anew the "Essence of Being and of Man."

It must be admitted that Heidegger himself never speaks of "composing" or "compositions"; he speaks only of *andenken*. The term "composing" is used here to make it absolutely clear that this "thinking" has not much to do with the thinking of traditional philosophy. I have said "composing"—and I even speak of "poetic composing"—in order to stress that it is, indeed, akin to poetry, though I certainly do not assert that it is identical with poetry. In any case, Heidegger's thinking has nothing to do with the "clear and distinct" representing-deducing Cartesian thinking, or with the justifying and "positing" post-Cartesian thinking. Nor does it have anything to do, any longer, with the method of phenomenological description that Heidegger had learned from his teacher, Husserl, but had even from the beginning, in my opinion, applied with "illegitimate" speculative presuppositions. To show the contrast I may quote one of Husserl's many definitions of the character of his philosophizing, the one contained in the sixth volume of the *Husserliana*: "an acting that must be with each and every step clear and understandable and must have the evidence of every preceding step as the platform for the next one."

Heidegger, even in his first phase, was apparently influenced by Kierkegaard's radical break with philosophy as an intersubjectively valid and testable truth. The ideal of Kierkegaard's "subjective thinker," who feels sincerely committed only to his "own subjective truth," prompted even the young Heidegger to insist that philosophizing is a most personal way of carrying out philosophical insights. It cannot be a disinterested observing and describing action, or an intuitive apprehending, *noesis*, in a philosophical attitude, be it that of Husserl's *epoché* or of Aristotle's *theoria*. Philosophizing, no less than any other form of "tuned understanding," is an articulation of a factuality—is an "existing way." The philosopher asking into the Essence of Being stands, in Heidegger's words, "in that question"; as being-in-world he is also always amidst world; and as "disclosed" he is always affected by mood, particularly the mood of dread.

Kierkegaard experienced the difficulty of direct communication. Similarly, Heidegger informs his readers that he had to break off the book *Sein und Zeit* because "language no longer gave itself" to him. He means that the traditional language of philosophy did not lend itself to an enunciation of his "new conception of philosophy." I believe, therefore, that it was from despair that he turned to his countryman, the poet Hölderlin, in an effort to find a new and rejuvenating relationship to speech and language. It was at this juncture that his thinking and speaking assumed a character akin to that of poetic composing.

Did it entirely lose the character of an intersubjectively valid form of expressing philosophical truth, and completely assume the form of an artistic composition, to which we commonly and in a specific sense accord the right to be "free" from intersubjectively verifiable standards? Here I can only touch on this difficult problem, and I cannot discuss the equally important question whether his philosophizing still follows the transcendental approach and obeys the strictures implied in it—though both questions might be important for an evaluation of Heidegger's works. Specifically I do not wish to prejudge the question whether only such "thinking" should be acknowledged as legitimate philosophizing which would stand an intersubjectively verifiable test or has a phenomenal or experiential basis accessible to everybody.

If we ask whether Heidegger's "remembering" kind of thinking obeys an "inner law" or "logos," it should immediately be said that it certainly does not stand under the rule of the "logos of thought" according to which Hegel's speculative philosophy moved. Schelling and Kierkegaard protested that Hegel's kind of speculative thinking had lost the immediate and simple experience of Being. Heidegger tries to restore just this experience to thinking by leading it back to Being, the element, the matrix, in which it is embedded—because *Dasein*, I repeat, realizes that thinking is a way of Being.

Where can thinking find the Essence of Being? It finds it in

the "second way of Being": in speech. The Greek word *logos* means primarily—according to Heidegger—the law of words, not the inner law of thought or of a given sentence. It is the essential interconnectedness between the true meaning of a given basic word and the true meaning of another word. Heidegger sees in these essentially interconnected true meanings of words the *archai*, the principles of speech. And since speech is, as it were, the living proof for Heidegger's assertion that Being arrives meaningfully, it follows, for him, that this "logos of words" should denote a "logos of the Essence of Being." Thinking should therefore encounter the Essence of Being by submitting itself to the "logos of words." But speech has deteriorated into a means of communication, and its principles have been forgotten. The new philosopher must learn to listen to the "logos of speech," to the logos of essentially interconnected words, and must creatively lift it out of oblivion.

As an example of the logos of speech denoting the "logos of the Essence of Being" Heidegger presents the word *denken*, said to be essentially interconnected with the word *danken*. This would correspond in English to "thinking" as essentially connected with "thanking." Speech itself, therefore, through this "inner law" or logos, tells the one who can listen to it that all "thinking" must be a "thanking," and in this sense it is a thinking toward and of—a "remembering" of—Being. What Heidegger had before found to be implied in the word *Dasein*—that thinking is a "way of Being"—is in this way indicated to be borne out by the "logos of speech" as the "logos of the Essence of Being." Another example, not translatable into English, is *Schickung-Geschick*, said to be essentially interconnected with *Geschichte*: what Being sends, what Being "fates," is History.

If Heidegger should claim that his reference to the logos of words constitutes an intersubjectively verifiable basis for his "remembering kind of thinking," and for his conception of the "Essence of Being and of Man," it would indeed have to be verified that other languages show similar, if not parallel, phe-

nomena. It is not certain, however, that Heidegger makes such a claim. He primarily wants to affirm that thinking would rejuvenate by remembering, because the full and deep significances asleep in every language are expressive of the Essence of Being. In this sense he regards speech as "the house of Being," the treasure house of sedimented logoi, in which man should learn to dwell again as the *zoon logon echon*, the being that, as of old, has been accorded the privilege of a special relationship to logos. It need hardly be mentioned that Heidegger's efforts—which give rise to many questions—have little or nothing to do with Humboldt's or Cassirer's contributions to "a philosophy of language," or with those of phenomenologists, French existentialists, and psychologists, or with the current controversies about signs and symbols.

In using the term "poetic composing" to identify Heidegger's new kind of "thinking," I refer less to Heidegger's concern with speech as already embodied in language than to a sort of speech that is still unexpressed, which he calls the "silent saying" that speaks meaningfully as the "logos of the Essence of Being" to the one who listens to it. Certainly no intersubjectively accessible method for this sort of communication exists. As Kierkegaard leaped from the religious stage toward an awareness of the "wholly Other," to God, and as Jaspers leaps from the level of existence to an awareness of the all-encompassing Being, God, so Heidegger appears here to leap onto the shores of Being, but Being does not mean God for Heidegger. When a great artist creates an important work of art we commonly accept it as a matter of course that he created it "by a stroke of genius." Though he did not have an intersubjectively valid method we are convinced that his work opens entirely new vistas into the essence of reality, and we accord to such a work of art its "own sort of truth and evidence." Again I do not wish to prejudge the question of legitimacy, but I would say that many of Heidegger's propositions—which I have called compositions—may have to be similarly judged.

An example is the way Heidegger composed anew toward the Essence of Being by composing anew the significance of the notion *Wesen*, a word that unfortunately can be translated only as Essence. Heidegger began in his second phase to use this notion with new connotations, without telling his readers his radical departures from the traditional meaning of Essence. This fact has not been recognized, and has led to many misinterpretations. Essence, whether in its scholastic significance of "definition" or as the Platonic "idea" or as the Aristotelian *eidos*, is only the "what" of a particular phenomenon. It has not been seen that Heidegger's new notion of *Wesen* comprises not only the "what" of a particular phenomenon but at the same time its "that," traditionally called its existence.

This, I believe, is one reason why he uses this notion mostly as a verb and, reserving it only for the articulation of "Being" and not of "particular beings," speaks of the ways that "Being *weset*." Being *weset* in and through the "particular beings," and thereby it constitutes their "what" and "that" at the same time. The Essence of Being is thus articulated as an event or occurrence. I have already described how "Being *weset*," or "occurs," by breaking open into overtness and world as the *Da*, thereby bringing about man's constitution.

I cannot here develop my contention that Heidegger, through his use of the notion "Being *weset*," composes anew the relationships of Being to Non-Being and of Being to Becoming—relationships which, as mentioned above, date back to the "first beginning"—nor can I discuss how and why Non-Being and Becoming are considered by him as inherent in Being. But I may still mention my belief that the composition "Being *weset*" aims also at overcoming the dichotomy between the "ought" and the "is," an aspiration that brings up many grave problems indeed. *Wesen* has for Heidegger the character of an appeal—a claim on man. Therefore a man who recognizes his Essence of *Dasein* realizes that he is by nature exposed to the "ways that Being *weset*," and

is therefore "responsible"—must respond to this claim. The new philosopher has to listen to the "ways that Being *wes*," and bring to conception what Being bestows on man as fate; thus in his recent essay, *Die Frage nach der Technik*, Heidegger has tried to show the way that "Being *wes*" in our present technological age. The thinker is thus conceived not as one who arbitrarily or because of his subjective views can bring about changes of *Wesen*, Essences, but as one who only speaks out what is fated. Hence it is wrong to say that Heidegger is a historicist or relativist. Rather it should be recognized that the problem whether the Essence of Being is immutable or mutable is here developed beyond the dimensions of the current controversy.

It should also be seen how the conception that thinkers "respond" to *Wesen* or Essences that arrive to them places Heidegger beyond the usual division of "idealism and realism"—for the Essences are neither posited by the thinker nor merely received. By the thinker's listening to the command of Essence and responding—"in and through" this act, for which the thinker as *Dasein* is "needed"—the *Wesen*-Essences articulate themselves.

Another example of *andenken* similar to poetic composing is the way the new philosopher, as *Dasein*, composes the way that "Being *wes*" as world. World is no longer seen from the point of view of man's constitution, his narrow pragmatic context of significances. *Dasein* must try to grasp world as an occurrence of Being, must listen to the way Being speaks silently, in response must poetically compose the ways the total and overt realm of world comes about, embracing and determining all-that-is. *Dasein* thereby fulfills its purpose; it "is," in so far as it lets overtness and world "be." This cannot be done by any scientific method or reflective approach, any more than one can scientifically grasp the all-determining character of a specific mood, such as the mood of a countryside on a hot summer afternoon, or grasp by "reflective approach" the mood of the still silence of falling snow. Thus the pre-Socratics poetically composed how *physis*, embracing

and determining all *physei onta*, unfolded itself into its elements. Similarly Heidegger poetically composes the all-encompassing meaningful realm of world as unfolding itself into the fourfold unity of heavens, earth, divinities, and mortals, and shows how the "particular beings," specifically man's "things," within this realm of an overt world mirror and reflect that fourfold unity.

We can see here Heidegger's attempt to help in building a new cosmos to take the place of the traditional one that Cartesianism had destroyed. It is not a cosmos of immutable Essences, teleologically ordered, as conceived by the Greeks, nor is it the meaningful order and hierarchy of divine Essences of mediaeval times. It is rather a cosmos, a world, of an ever active manifestation of the ways that "Being *west*."

I believe I have demonstrated that Heidegger in trying for a "second beginning" has arrived at a conception of the "task of philosophy" and of the "character of philosophizing" that is close to that which the philosophers of the "first beginning" may have had, though its actual content is different. I have also emphasized why Heidegger, realizing himself as *Dasein*, feels himself "needed," as an instrument and voice, just as the pre-Socratics are described to have felt themselves. Further, I have characterized his conception of philosophy as close to that of poetry. A poet understands his creative ability as something that must wait for inspiration from somewhere else. Recently when Heidegger was asked about a point found missing in his total conception he answered "Yes, I know something must yet come to me about this point"; after a pause he added "I know it will."

Thus Heidegger, in losing the self-certainty of a Cartesian subject, has become imbued with a strong conviction that he is the "voice and instrument of Being"; in abandoning his very self to his calling he has gained an absolute assurance in answering that call. This development marks Heidegger's "self-understanding as a philosopher," and thereby characterizes his "new conception of philosophy."

BOOK REVIEWS

GOLDSMITH, RAYMOND W. *A Study of Saving in the United States*. Vol. I: *Introduction: Tables of Annual Estimates of Saving, 1897-1949*; xxx & 1138 pp. Vol. II: *Nature and Derivation of Annual Estimates of Saving, 1897-1949*; xxiv & 632 pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1955. \$30 set.

In commenting on these volumes an economist wants first of all to express his gratitude to Goldsmith and his associates for their perseverance, and to the Life Insurance Association for its generosity—factors which together have made this Herculean undertaking possible. Saving is one of the most important yet most elusive phenomena in economics. In these volumes is compiled all the available information on the saving and dissaving of households, farms, unincorporated business enterprises (about which we are in “scandalous ignorance”), corporations, and federal, state, and local governments over a period of more than fifty years. This wealth of information is not merely presented as a collection of unprocessed data, but is combined and consolidated into a system of national saving figures, classified in a variety of ways and related to other relevant economic facts. The result is a presentation of meaningful saving aggregates and ratios for the use of the economist.

The study confirms the findings of others that the personal saving ratio over the last fifty years has fluctuated, by and large, around a level that does not show marked changes. Excluding investment in consumer durables, but not consumer debt, there appears to be a somewhat declining trend in the ratio of personal saving to income. Of much greater significance, however, are the findings concerning changes in the structure and character of personal saving. Significant is the rising share, in personal saving, represented by purchases of consumer durables, life insurance, and pension funds, and the declining share represented by corporate stocks and bonds, mortgages, and real estate. It will not be possible in this review to examine the statistical sources and derivations in detail. Rather, I shall confine my comments to certain general aspects of the study, particularly the Summary of Findings (Vol. I, Part I) and The Measurement of Saving in a System of Social Accounting (Vol. II, Part I).

In its basic approach this undertaking has used the social-accounting method as a general frame of reference for the definition of saving and

for preparing different saving aggregates, which are then checked with one another for internal consistency. As a matter of fact, the study presents a valuable explanation of the social-accounting approach in general. I wish, however, that we could agree on using the term national economic accounting rather than social accounting. Social accounting suggests that we not only measure monetary transactions and those transactions "in kind" which can easily be imputed, but also take account of those costs and benefits that accrue to individuals or enterprises not directly concerned with these transactions. Goldsmith recognizes that there are such "social" benefits and costs (II, 6). The computing of so-called social economic accounts, in the past, has never gone beyond a consolidation of individual transactions, which should more accurately be called national economic accounting. This does not deny that national economic accounts may be useful in connection with social-welfare analyses.

Goldsmith defines saving as a change in earned net worth (excluding changes from revaluation of existing assets and liabilities). This definition makes it possible to measure national saving and saving by groups through the use of income and expenditure accounts, on the one hand, and balance-sheet accounts, on the other. In determining whether certain items should be included within this definition or excluded from it, Goldsmith in most cases presents his estimates in alternative ways, so that the material is of equal value to those who happen to agree and those who do not agree with his specific definitions.

This applies, for example, to the question whether expenditures for consumer durables are or are not to be regarded as saving. Another such question is the treatment of social-insurance funds. Goldsmith treats them as savings belonging to the beneficiaries. I do not quarrel with this interpretation, but I wonder what he would do if Congress should change our social-security financing program by shifting to some kind of pay-as-you-go system. Assume that revenues now allocated to the various trust funds were still collected but were included in the general fund of the Treasury. In Goldsmith's accounting the saving would be shifted from individual to government saving (or to less dissaving, if by this shift an otherwise accruing government deficit were reduced). For the individual, however, everything else would remain the same. He would pay as taxes the same amount he had paid as contribution. He would accrue the same claims under the benefit provisions of the law. His motivation for additional voluntary saving would be unaffected. And yet the mere change in federal book-

keeping would substantially alter the amounts and ratios of personal saving. I do not believe that there is a satisfactory solution for all such classification problems, but I did not find them adequately discussed.

Goldsmith regards income-and-expenditure accounting and asset-and-liability accounting as two methods of equal value in social accounting. I would give the income-and-expenditure accounting a decidedly higher rank, and regard balance-sheet accounting mainly as a valuable auxiliary method. A deficiency of the balance-sheet approach becomes apparent when treating a balance sheet of the government. Goldsmith states that the federal government is the only group for which liabilities have exceeded assets, reaching a debt-to-asset ratio of 300 percent and more after the war (I, 210 ff.). He refers to the "failure to capitalize the taxing power of governmental units" (II, 11), but dismisses this deficiency by reference to the fact that private enterprises also fail to capitalize assets of a comparable intangible nature (but not of comparable size!).

I believe, however, that business enterprises possess no asset comparable to what the taxing power means to the government. Moreover, as Goldsmith himself points out, there are certain differences between business accounting and social accounting. He says quite rightly that "Social accounting is not [perhaps he should have said, should not be] guided by the 'principle of conservatism' which is of such importance in business accounting" (II, 7). This principle makes it inadvisable for an enterprise to capitalize a favorable market position, because such a position may change. But the argument does not apply to the government's taxing power. Actually, I think that the balance-sheet account for government is seriously misleading, as Goldsmith's own figures demonstrate.

Goldsmith presents the results of his labor with great modesty. A third volume is still missing, and even in the two that are published he repeatedly emphasizes that he has not completed the job of processing and interpreting his data. This would have required more theoretical insight into the functions of saving in the modern economy, more econometric analysis; and especially more psychological knowledge of saving habits and motivations. Thus these studies have not answered the question whether saving or investment has primacy in the dynamic process (I, 21). We are grateful for the building material Goldsmith and his associates have provided for us, but we are still in the dark concerning the dynamic economic relationships between saving, investment, and growth in incomes.

In a few pages of the introduction Goldsmith briefly drops his caution and presents some tentative conclusions concerning these crucial questions. He states his belief that consumption standards are a group phenomenon and that the average excess of income over customary expenditures is a fairly stable proportion of income. On the basis of these and some related assumptions he concludes that "consumption in the long run will increase in step with income." This has been interpreted by some as proposing that there is no ground for the Keynesian concern that in the long run the propensity to save may outrun the propensity to invest. It would be of great importance indeed if, on the basis of statistics, such a conclusion could be reached.

Goldsmith himself is most careful in his statement. Nevertheless, I would like to point out why I do not think that this conclusion can properly be drawn from the data presented in this work. Goldsmith (who has contributed to the misinterpretation by calling "standard of consumption" a phenomenon that includes elements of saving) says that the standard for any group includes some amount and kinds of saving which are forced on the group either by law or by custom (I, 15). These kinds include life-insurance premiums, social-security contributions, home-mortgage amortization, and the acquisition of consumer durables—categories of personal saving that show a strong upward trend as compared with other types of saving that show a relative decline. Goldsmith rightly states that the length of the retirement period is rising, and that the proportion of retirement income to working-life income has been rising, all of which makes for a higher "required personal saving ratio." He could have added that the increased desire to acquire automobiles and other consumer durable goods has been so intense that for many families it has crowded out the ability to make adequate provisions for old age (except through private and public pension funds), for the education of their children, and for the "rainy day."

It is entirely possible that as soon as a certain standard or level of consumer durables has been reached, the rising saving requirements for these other purposes will make themselves felt, and saving may then become as much of the "group standard of living" as the automobile or TV set. In fact, the ratio of savings to income may even show a rising trend in the future. In short, I believe that the group-standard argument does not prove the likelihood that "consumption in the long run will increase in step with income." It all depends on what kind of saving, and how much, will gradually become part of the group standard. Furthermore, in this whole discussion only very

little reference is made to corporate saving and its rising importance in total saving.

Thus I think Goldsmith is right when he says that in spite of all the statistical information which has been made available the crucial questions concerning the role of saving in our economic process still remain unanswered (I, x). But it is equally true that no economist will tackle these questions without benefiting from the tremendous amount of spadework done by Goldsmith.

GERHARD COLM

National Planning Association, Washington

THORELLI, HANS B. *The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradition*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1955. xvi & 658 pp. \$8.

"This treatise has a dual purpose. First, it attempts to push the frontiers of research concerning the federal antitrust policy of the United States somewhat further in various directions. Secondly, it attempts to present between two covers the materials needed for a synthesized social science interpretation of the origination and institutionalization period of that policy and to make such a synthesis." Quite simply, it is a history of the attempt to control combinations, conspiracies in restraint of trade, and private restrictive arrangements (with a preliminary outline of common-law action), from the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Law in 1890 to 1904—that is, through the first Theodore Roosevelt administration. Primarily a history, it deals extensively with the rise of ideas and political action based on them which attempted to prevent "big business" from becoming "monopoly business." Since this embraces a huge sector of American political as well as economic history, the task was enormous.

Corwin Edwards, in his Foreword, says "It is a delight to read a work which combines objectivity, imagination, and authoritative familiarity with the field," and Corwin Edwards is right. He is right too in hoping that a later volume will cover the history of antitrust policy from 1904 on. The fact that Dr. Thorelli is a Swede gives him a detached point of view which few Americans could achieve.

Few will dispute Thorelli's claim that "the industrial consolidation movement was doubtless of more momentous significance than any other development in American society around the turn of the century." It did affect American civilization. In retrospect we can see that it provided a base for the sunburst of economic development we have today. It also engendered problems of every kind which

crowd on us now. Central among them was, and is, the problem of maintaining a democracy in the face of a concentration of economic power heretofore unknown to history. The issue is with us in 1956 as it was in 1900, and the antitrust law is still the classic instrument. The personalities, intellectual, financial, and political, that pass through these pages are familiar to every student of the politics of our century. Very little that is said by Mr. Justice Douglas or Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney, by former President (of the United States) Harry Truman or by former President (of the United States Steel Corporation) Benjamin Fairless, does not parallel observations made in the struggles of half a century ago. The reader, putting the book down, wonders whether he has not been reading a review of current Washington rather than a chronicle of times past. The material is there; it would take a more skillful student than this reviewer to find significant omissions.

Emphasis is a matter of taste. I am not convinced that the current jargon of social science has yet become sufficiently accurate and uniform to be wholly useful. The fact was that the United States wanted its industry and wanted lots of it; also that plenty of Americans wanted either to make a great deal of money or to make their enterprise very big. Ambition for money and power has always sparked a great deal of history. In this country big business was the result. The average American did not object to that. But he did, in a hazy way, want something else as well. He wanted everybody to have a chance of getting into the game, and he did not (repeat, not) want big business running the government. Probably a compelling instinct was an inarticulate tropism toward something like separation of powers. He has fought wars and revolutions to make sure the Executive power shall be separated from the Legislative, and the Legislative from the Judicial. There may also be a principle that economic power shall not be unduly combined with any of the three.

As it works out politically, this means that the American public rather likes big business so long as (a) it is not visibly a monopoly; (b) it behaves itself; and (c) it does not become so powerful that it threatens to dominate the integrity of the political state. When any of these things happen, public opinion demands that the political state step in. The classic way in which the American government can do this is by starting an antitrust action, though President Franklin D. Roosevelt demonstrated that there were other ways as well. Poise and counterpoise in the political history of our country follow the consensus of public opinion in this regard.

A reader of Dr. Thorelli's book will not find it surprising that only seven years after the administration of President Franklin Roosevelt was engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle with the big-business community, the Eisenhower administration practically turned over the administration of all government departments to men whose principal qualification was that they were big businessmen or their lawyers. The reader likewise can forecast, with almost dead certainty, that eight or ten years from now another administration will again be called on to redress the balance now tipping toward the big-business side.

Nevertheless the technical problems will differ in each period, and those of 1900-04 will not wholly repeat themselves. Thorelli quotes Professor Walton Hamilton as saying that the Sherman Antitrust Act is "a weapon of policy from another age"—but grimly adds "so is the Constitution." Our new age thus introduces new problems. We struggle to control monopoly, which is one thing; we talk in terms of "preserving competition," which is quite another: ". . . while monopoly control is an indispensable, it is not a sufficient prerequisite to a competitive policy in contemporary complex societies." And there is a "subtle but vital distinction between prohibiting certain types of reprehensible behavior on the one hand and positively prescribing or directly regulating business conduct on the other."

Thorelli could not be more right. Preventing big business from trying to run the country is one thing. Going back to the automatic competitive balances so dear to classic economists is another. If Thorelli had done nothing else (as he has), the service performed in making this clear is outstanding. *The Federal Antitrust Policy* is essential in the library of every student either of American politics or of the present American economic system.

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.

Columbia University

NATIONAL MANPOWER COUNCIL. *A Policy for Skilled Manpower*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1954. xxv & 299 pp. \$4.50.

The National Manpower Council—established at Columbia University in 1951 and composed of sixteen leaders from industry, labor, education, and the professions—deals in this publication with facts and issues about skilled manpower, prepared by its staff under the direction of Dr. Eli Ginzberg and Dr. Henry David. The material, derived prevailingly from government publications, is preceded by a Statement of the National Manpower Council, presenting recommen-

dations for a strengthening of the nation's resources of skilled workers and technicians. The problem of assuring a supply of skilled labor, says the Council, can no longer be left to chance, especially since automation will increase the need. The recommendations—addressed to business, labor, education, and the government—concern, among others, secondary education, vocational guidance, training methods.

The survey deals with the role of skilled manpower in economic development, trends in the demand for skills, opportunities and incentives for acquiring skills, vocational education and vocational guidance, secondary and vocational education, and other aspects of manpower. Severe criticism is directed against the vocational schools, which have frequently become a dumping ground for misfits. Secondary education, with its inadequate equipment, low salaries, and meager prestige for teachers, has failed to attract the type of teaching staff it would need to fulfill its task. The book's criticisms as well as its recommendations deserve wide recognition.

FRIEDA WUNDERLICH

Graduate Faculty of the New School

LANGE, M. G. *Totalitäre Erziehung—Das Erziehungssystem der Sowjetzone Deutschlands*. [Schriften des Instituts für politische Wissenschaft, Freie Universität und Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, Berlin, Band 3.] Frankfurt a/M: Verlag der Frankfurter Hefte. 1954. xlviii & 432 pp.

This study offers a comprehensive presentation of the development, and the standing, of public education in the German Soviet Zone to the summer of 1953, including the gradual revelation of the long-range goals and basic principles embodied in the educational policies of the Soviet occupation powers and their executors, both in the Central Committee of the "Socialist Unity Party" and in the state administration. It demonstrates the progressive adoption of "Soviet pedagogics" in theory and application, and shows the development of pressure devices for the ideological remolding of teachers and for channeling the orientations of pupils, from kindergarten through secondary schools. The book brings "the whole story"; its documentation, conscientious and technically clear, is all that could be desired.

The author, who comes from the Weimar movement for progressive education (*Schulreform*), entered the Socialist Unity party in 1946 via the Social Democratic party, and up to 1950 he was editor of the official magazine *Pädagogik*. Like other former Social Democrats he was deceived by the initial restraint shown by the Soviet authorities and

the Communist leadership, and hoped that the liberal and anti-authoritarian goals of the old *Schulreform* would be realized in the new educational system of the Soviet Zone. When the trend was decisively reversed in 1948, he followed the example of many intellectuals by feigning conformity and hiding his inner resistance behind semantic finesses—which eventually deceived not only his censors but his readers as well. His personal story in itself, revealed in a series of incidental remarks, explains a great deal about the inner situation of the non-conformist intellectuals within the process of "Sovietization."

Lange is not only an experienced educator but also one who knows the Soviet Zone educational system thoroughly from the inside. He shows that the latter has developed through three main stages. A "liberal" course prevailed until 1948, bringing a simplification and unification of the school system, the abolition of educational privileges, the introduction, at least in principle, of university training for teachers, and similar progressive measures. But with the transition to economic planning in 1948, "what had been reached under a democratic goal was transformed according to the model of the Soviets" (p. 369). The educational institutions, at all levels, were forced into the service of the political propaganda of the SED, with its pronounced anti-Western course under the slogans of "peace," "unity," and "new patriotism." The ideas of the old *Schulreform* were now denounced as means for "imperialist" corruption of youth. The pedagogical texts of the Soviet Union became guides for teachers' education; minutely detailed curricula in all fields of instruction were premanufactured, and the authoritarian principle of instruction fully reestablished. Simultaneously the exponents of the Communist-controlled "Free German Youth" penetrated the schools, assuming direct control of administrative and pedagogical measures. A campaign against the "objectivism" of teachers (and scientists) was carried out, with the aim of instilling complete "partiality" in favor of the Soviet-Communist orientation.

In 1952, when the "construction of socialism" was undertaken, the politicizing of education was driven to extremes. The final goal of education became the production of ideologically indoctrinated specialists for all fields of the planned economy, according to the demands of the five-year plan. Pre-military education was introduced both in youth organizations and in upper classes of the public schools. "Soviet pedagogics" became the exclusive basis of educational theory and practice. Constant controls were established to check on the performance of the pupils and the pre-planned progress of education,

and there was a rigorous political control of the teachers. An extensive "purification" of the secondary schools was carried out at the beginning of 1953. Obligatory teachers' *aktivs* (small workshops) were installed, both for the transmission of political-educational directives and as a means for continuous control of all teachers. The university training of teachers was abolished in favor of the Soviet system of specialized training for teachers of the lower, middle, and upper grades.

The school situation was not basically changed by the "new course" adopted in June 1953, but it is constantly disturbed by the "dynamics" of the system. Changes of policy and orientation follow one another more quickly than it is possible to manufacture new texts. Curricula are altered before the teachers can familiarize themselves with them. The control of principals and teachers through youth and party organizations leads to serious disruptions, calling for periodical curbs of the SED watchdogs. Pressures and threats produce outward conformity, but not the spirit necessary for educational success. The minority of teachers who adhere to the ruling party are so overworked in school and outside "functions" that they cannot cope with their tasks. The SED-controlled youth organizations are unable to recruit enough "reliable" candidates for the pedagogical institutions, and the supply of teachers is considerably below requirements. Emergency systems for the training of teachers have failed to fill the quotas but have lowered the standards of instruction. These flaws unquestionably hamper the educational system of the Soviet Zone. But they may not make it ineffectual.

Lange's exhaustive and outstanding study is preceded by an introduction by A. R. L. Gurland, until 1954 director of the Institut für politische Wissenschaft. He supplies a general theoretical background which opens up new lanes for the comprehension of totalitarian systems and the conditions of their inner development. His considerations of the factors and functions of the "manipulation of consciousness" as an essential part of the "technique of totalitarian rule" constitute a contribution to political sociology.

HELMUT R. WAGNER

Research Division of the New School

EATON, JOSEPH W., in collaboration with Robert J. Weil. *Culture and Mental Disorders: A Comparative Study of the Hutterites and other Populations*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. 1955. 254 pp. \$4.

The Hutterite people of North America stem from a sixteenth-century Protestant sect which came to the United States in the 1870s

to find religious asylum. They possess the highest sustained reproduction rate of any modern population, and number at present about 8,600 individuals, living in South Dakota, Montana, Alberta, and Manitoba.

Inhabiting small colonies consisting of approximately 100 individuals each, they practice strict agricultural communism, providing complete economic security and equality to all their members. Both their religious and their secular leaders are elected by a form of democratic patriarchy. They practice austerity of dress and manner. Their children receive an elementary-school education which is not unsympathetic to youthful rebelliousness. Children are well loved by their parents and are nevertheless subjected at an early age to the strict discipline of the community. Hutterites do not trust the world, but they are remarkably successful in coming to terms with it. They make use of its technology and seek the advice of its specialists, but they strictly forbid intermarriage between their people and the world. They do not think of themselves as a utopian community; rather, they believe they are only trying to live a true Christian life.

It was their highly reputed freedom from mental disorders and from crime, their relaxed manner of living, which induced a team of social scientists to study their culture as a "laboratory" in the etiology of mental illness. The authors of this study have made a careful enumeration of mental illness among the Hutterites, and have compared their findings with those of nine other mental-health surveys conducted by European and Asian scientists. And they have found, despite the "ideal" picture of Hutterite society as one extending the maximum in security toward its members, that the prevalence of pathology is comparatively high. The frequency of psychosis among Hutterites (6.3 to 1,000) actually exceeded that of two American populations—the Baltimore Eastern Health District and Williamson County, Tennessee.

The remainder of the book is concerned with an etiological analysis. The authors take a rather conservative position regarding the recent rise of social psychiatry. They are convinced from their studies of comparative cultures that culture does play a role in molding the incidence and type of mental disorder: ecological studies must always play an initial role in the study of mental health. Nevertheless, present-day quantitative methods are not, they maintain, sufficiently flexible to discover the dynamic syndromes of mental disorder. In his conclusion the senior author states that "Questions of the specific relationship of sociological variables and symptoms of mental disorder

are largely unexplored." Thus he returns in part to an older theoretical position.

Perhaps a union of genetic and social factors will be fruitful for any future hypothesis. The reader of this book may possibly feel that American social science has been too grandiose in certain of its claims to knowledge about human beings in society. He may even sympathize with the authors. But it will perhaps be difficult for him to understand why the method of case histories was not used to fuller advantage if the authors are so doubtful about the efficacy of quantitative methods. In such crucial areas as child-rearing practices the reader is given a very cursory glimpse at the Hutterite family life, and even this is presented in the form of a typification. There seems to be no evidence of any attempt to seek out possible variations from the average or the typical. We are informed that some psychological tests were given, but their findings are not reported in detail.

Considerable information is given about this society in order to justify the comparative method in etiology. Psychosis in Hutterite society seems to be largely manic-depressive; of 53 psychotics, only 17 percent were schizophrenic. Women outnumbered men by 23 percent—which seems to follow the nineteenth-century pattern of mental illness. Depressive symptoms were also very prominent among the 69 cases of neurosis. The authors point out that the term manic-depressive is a misnomer when applied as a diagnostic classification to the Hutterites; there was no manic phase to their illness. There was also little aggression and virtually no crime of a violent nature. Depression is called *Anfechtung* by the Hutterites, or a temptation by the devil which afflicts "good people." Schizophrenia is not given a religious significance; it is called "broken nerves," "fright," "grief over death," or "disappointment in love." There were extremely few psychopaths, and they were regarded in quite another manner; they were the "black sheep," the people of "bad will."

These ethnic findings are briefly discussed in connection with certain theories of etiology. The social-cohesion theory, for example, tries to explain the wide prevalence of manic-depression in certain "highly integrated" societies by pointing to the extreme dependence of the individual upon the group, and the lack of a single dominant parental figure from whom the child may seek approval. Individuals are taught to look for guilt within themselves. They may not release their aggressive drives, and instead must seek out socially acceptable neurotic or psychotic patterns. Schizophrenia is not a socially acceptable pattern of response in such a society. The theory of social-genetic

drift is also given credence. Of the 39 cases of manic-depression among the Hutterites, 16 were found to be closely related to at least one other case of this kind. According to this theory the survival needs of a group can be understood as attracting and encouraging certain attributes of personality; throughout centuries of persecution and isolation, these qualities will tend to be reproduced. The presence of a rather large number of mental defectives and epileptics among the Hutterites tends to confirm this theory of genetic selection.

This study has made a contribution to our knowledge about mental health, especially in regard to that lingering myth that civilization is responsible for mental breakdown. It has, moreover, brought to the attention of reflective people the formidable issues that still plague the development of social science, particularly in regard to its methodology. In a final discussion of mental health, the authors inform us that "the concept of mental health is not a scientific but a value judgment." They point out that Hutterite society is quite healthy if judged by the rarity of anti-social acts; that it is less healthy if judged by the degree of freedom and creative development permitted the individual. They caution us that the Hutterite evaluation of his way of life must needs be different from ours; that to the Hutterite a considerable amount of religious transgression takes place, but that the psychological symptom is largely understood by him as a function of his religious ethos.

The authors have thus discovered that an outwardly healthy people can in reality show a fairly sizable prevalence of morbidity and remain unaffected, for the simple reason that its ethos is not concerned with the meaning of morbidity as such, but rather accepts it as the possibility for transcendence. Such a finding might induce social science to consider the meaning of that phenomenon which it loosely calls society, in order to understand better the delicate relationship between society as a norm of human existence and the continuous presence of pathology in human experience.

ELLIOTT N. CAMERMAN

New York City

PARSONS, TALCOTT, and ROBERT F. BALES (with James Olds, Morris Zelditch, and Philip Slater). *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. 1955. xvii & 422 pp. \$6.

Ogburn's report in *Recent Social Trends* stated that the American family had tended toward a smaller-sized, nuclear form of parents and children. In the family, he held, economic, social, religious, and educa-

tive functions were diminishing, but the American family was far from losing its affective functions. Parsons, who earlier noted the isolation and bilaterality of this nuclear American family, now goes on to challenge the theory of total disorganization. He cites the general stability of marriage rates in our increasing population; he sees divorces concentrated in the younger, childless marriages; he tabulates the recent stabilizations in our birth rate, and the increase of single-family dwellings; and finally, he stresses the practical universality of the family as a sub-system of societies. Processes of socialization and structural role-differentiation remain as prime functions of the family, American or otherwise.

Bales adds points on functional differentiation in the social interaction processes of small groups. Zelditch discusses a sample of family structures in nonliterate cultures. Olds describes possible psychological mechanisms in the socialization process and in psychopathology. Slater elaborates on role-differentiation in small groups.

I quote, approvingly: "Personalities as systems of action and social systems on the cultural level are empirically inseparable from each other and from their culture." These are not merely interdependent, as independent and dependent variables; they interpenetrate (p. 32). One thinks of Boas, Goldenweiser, and Sapir in cultural anthropology, emphatic on the same point. Parsons adds weighting to the importance of culture: "This common culture is in fact constitutive of the structural framework of *both* orders of system, particularly in the form of patterns of value-orientation."

Contradicting this formulation, *the* family is described, next, as a "specialized, differentiated" part of larger sociocultural systems undergoing a kind of differentiation that leans equally on Herbert Spencer and Freud. The Spencerian notion has earlier, less highly differentiated systems historically precede our own nuclear family. Spencer is evolutionary, and seeks both internal and external factors inducing this change. Parsons will say—with infinitely greater modernity—"Neither personalities nor social systems can be adequately understood without reference to culture," by which is meant "knowledge and adequate analytic understanding of culture" (p. 33). But in defining the principles in family-kin structure determined by cultural roles, the networks of relationship are moved in an overall systematic synthesis away from cultural differentiation in favor of a unitary and pan-human application of a revised Freudian system.

If Spencerian, noncultural differentiation is relied upon, how is it used? First of all, an individual participating in a family and in a

sociocultural system will, in the nuclear family, participate in a reduced number of networks of relationship, adding to the centrality and nuclear character of the family. No doubt this happens.

What, then, is the modification of the Freudian system and how is it used? The Freudian biological (id), which Freud said constituted the basis of an energy-distribution system and operated or was modified in an Oedipal-type of family based on sexual difference, Parsons transmutes to a system of biosocial roles, determined by the social differentiation of roles in the family. The only difficulty with this revision of Freud, certainly much like Freud's own revision of his system in *The Ego and The Id*, is that the networks of relationship, the social roles developed, are not distinguished by class and cultural background. Instead, as with Freud, we have a pan-human system with no "environmental" shadings and differences. The father role is instrumental-superior in re status; and the mother is expressive-superior in re the emotional climate of the home. Sons and brothers are slated for instrumental-inferior berths, and daughters and sisters for expressive-inferior ones.

What is overlooked here are the contrary *balances* achieved in other cultural backgrounds than middle-class "American," the various American ethnic subcultures, and the different status systems. Status demarcators and economic position do not always stem exclusively from fathers, and mothers singlehandedly and uniformly do not always provide emotional climates. "The primary integration of the child with the mother as a love-object" (p. 48) would strike a Freudian with a female patient as a most indecisive and incomplete formulation; even for the normal, it is a drastic reduction from a system stressing sexual difference. That a mother cathexis later matures to integration "in the family" is also indecisive. The real question is: what social and cultural demands are imposed stressfully upon males and females at different points in the life cycle and in terms of role expectancies in existing social and cultural settings? I suspect one would have to study psychopathology and normal development in such different settings to get the answers. Relationships may be intersexual, interpersonal, and as George H. Mead suggested, interactive. Even so, they occur in different social structures, in different class and status groups, and in different cultures and subcultures.

All general assertions in the book beg the same question: what are the historically wrought systems of value and systems of meaning for a sex, for a network of relationships, for a class or status grouping, and for persons of given cultural background? Are *all* males, as is

asserted, subject in transitions from pre-Oedipal to post-Oedipal strivings to move a greater distance and with greater subjection to strain than all females? One type of ulcer was *once* a more prevalent female ailment. What are the varying sex roles in social and expressive life in a given culture and class?

While Spencer distinguished internal and external "forces" in a social system, and roughly weighted them, the present system again generalizes from Freud on the constant internalization of objects. Here Freud felt internalization was *one type* of mechanism with various degrees of usage. The present book is more like recent phenomenological psychiatry (see J. H. Van Den Berg's *The Phenomenological Approach to Psychiatry*, 1955). Subject and object, in the disturbed, exist only in a sojourn of constantly internalized objects absorbed in the magical flight from reality. But how did they get that way? Durkheim's collective sentiments, or Mead's constant influence of others, have internal effect only after, and so far as, the external, environmental effect is felt. Catatonics, like the rest of us, are selective

LAND ECONOMICS

a quarterly journal of

Planning, Housing, and Public Utilities

CONTENTS FOR NOVEMBER 1955

INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND LOCATIONAL CHANGES IN THE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY: 1880-1950.....	Helen Hunter
PRICING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS.....	John Vernon Patrick, Jr.
NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN HOUSING CENSUS.....	Morton Hoffman
LAND OWNERSHIP IN MINNESOTA.....	Marian Deininger and Douglas Marshall
MECHANICS OF THE URBAN ECONOMIC BASE: CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE BASE RATIOS AND THE BASE RATIO ELEMENTS (III).....	Richard B. Andrews
THE EFFECT OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION UPON THE FHA- AND VA-INSURED HOUSING MARKET IN NEW YORK STATE.....	Robert C. Weaver
REFLECTIONS ON RURAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.....	Frank R. Bray

Published in February, May, August, and November

Subscription — \$6.00 per year

Single copies — \$2.00

Sterling Hall

University of Wisconsin

Madison 6, Wis.

according to what they consider are systems of meaning. In Figure 10 (p. 105) denial of Oedipal aggression is followed by functionally adequate performance. Freud by no means ignored repression and denial, but suggested that mature gratifications must be turned before the page is turned. The latency-period and adolescence-period swings between childhood confusions and emotional maturation occur in a setting where much depends upon culture, status, and specific family constellations. While later (p. 158) social value systems are again invoked, in reality they are there from the start to the finish.

James Olds also discusses psychopathology as independent of sociocultural backgrounds, and categories like paranoid schizophrenia as invariant. It is hoped that the unit psychosis is not being revived here, and diagnostic rigidities assumed for "illness entities" at a time when psychiatry is moving ahead to more adequate social psychiatric concepts, data, and analysis.

MARVIN K. OPLER

Cornell University Medical College

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

CONTENTS, DECEMBER 1955, VOLUME 45

INTERREGIONAL INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS.....	<i>L. N. Moses</i>
THE THEORY OF OCCUPATIONAL WAGE DIFFERENTIALS.....	<i>M. W. Reder</i>
WAGE GUARANTEES OF RAILROAD EMPLOYEES... ..	<i>M. A. Horowitz</i>
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.....	<i>Charles Wolf, Jr.</i>
ITALIAN SURVEY OF UNEMPLOYMENT.....	<i>G. H. Hildebrand</i>
WALRAS AND HIS ECONOMIC SYSTEM.....	<i>Milton Friedman</i>
REVISION OF TRANSPORT REGULATORY POLICY.....	<i>J. C. Nelson</i>

Reviews, Titles of New Books, Periodicals, Notes

The *American Economic Review*, a quarterly, is the official publication of the American Economic Association and is sent to all members. The annual dues are \$6.00. Address editorial communications to Dr. Bernard F. Haley, Editor, *American Economic Review*, Stanford University, Room 220, Stanford, California; for information concerning other publications and activities of the Association, communicate with the Secretary-Treasurer, Dr. James Washington Bell, American Economic Association, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.

Send for information booklet.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE BULLETIN



*published quarterly by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganisation, 19 Avenue Kléber, Paris 16^e*

VOLUME VII, NUMBER 3

Evaluation Techniques

Methods and Results—An International Approach

Contributors to this issue: E. Barnitz—E. Beaglehole—M. Jahoda
—O. Klineberg—W. Maslow—K. M. Miller—L. Moss—C. Sell-
tiz—M. Brewster Smith—C. R. Wright

Organization in the Social Sciences—Terminology—Reviews of
Documents, Periodicals and Books—News and Announcements

Open Forum: The Uses of the Law in the Struggle Against
Bigotry, by Will Maslow

Annual rate: \$3.50; single copy: \$1.00


U. S. Distributor:

Unesco Publications Center, 475 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- ADAM, THOMAS R. *Modern Colonialism: Institutions and Policies*. [Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science.] Garden City: Doubleday. 1955. viii & 88 pp. 95 cents.
- ATAMIAN, SARKIS. *The Armenian Community: The Historical Development of a Social and Ideological Conflict*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1955. 479 pp. \$4.75.
- BAKER, GORDON E. *Rural Versus Urban Political Power: The Nature and Consequences of Unbalanced Representation*. [Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science.] Garden City: Doubleday. 1955. viii & 70 pp. 95 cents.
- BERESFORD, MAURICE. *The Lost Villages of England*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1954. 445 pp. \$12.
- BLAU, PETER M. *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy: A Study of Interpersonal Relations in Two Government Agencies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1955. xi & 269 pp. \$5.
- BOULDING, KENNETH E. *Economic Analysis*. [Third ed.] New York: Harper. 1955. xx & 905 pp. \$6.50.
- BUCHANAN, NORMAN S., and HOWARD S. ELLIS. *Approaches to Economic Development*. New York: Twentieth Century Fund. 1955. xiv & 494 pp. \$5.
- CALVOCORESSI, PETER, with the assistance of Konstanze Isepp. *Survey of International Affairs, 1952*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1955. viii & 473 pp. \$7.20.
- CLARK, LEADIE M. *Walt Whitman's Concept of the American Common Man*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1955. xiv & 176 pp. \$3.75.
- CLAUDE, INIS L., JR. *National Minorities: An International Problem*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1955. xii & 248 pp. \$4.50.
- COHEN, ALBERT K. *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. 1955. 202 pp. \$3.50.
- DONAHUE, WILMA, comp. *Education for Later Maturity: A Handbook*. [Auspices of Adult Education Association of U.S.A.] New York: Whiteside and William Morrow. 1955. xiii & 338 pp. \$4.50.
- EDEL, ABRAHAM. *Ethical Judgment: The Use of Science in Ethics*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. 1955. 348 pp. \$5.
- FERM, VERGILIUS. *A Dictionary of Pastoral Psychology*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1955. xi & 336 pp. \$6.
- FORTUNE EDITORS. *The Changing American Market*. Garden City: Hanover House. 1955. 304 pp. \$4.50.
- GILLESPIE, JAMES M., and GORDON W. ALLPORT. *Youth's Outlook on the Future*. [Doubleday Papers in Psychology.] Garden City: Doubleday. 1955. ix & 61 pp. 85 cents.
- GREEN, HELEN D., with foreword by W. I. Newstetter. *Social Work Practice in Community Organization*. New York: Whiteside and William Morrow. 1954. ix & 253 pp. \$4.
- HAINES, C. GROVE, ed. *Africa Today*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1955. xvi & 510 pp. \$6.
- HART, H. L. A., intro. *John Austin's The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence*. New York: Noonday Press. 1955. xxxi & 396 pp. \$3.50.
- JONASSEN, C. T. *The Shopping Center Versus Downtown: A Motivation Research on Shopping Habits and Attitudes in Three Cities*. Columbus: Ohio State University, Bureau of Business Research. 1955. xviii & 170 pp. \$3.50.

- KEENE, DONALD. *Japanese Literature: An Introduction for Western Readers*. New York: Grove. 1955. x & 114 pp. \$2.50 hard cover, \$1.00 paper.
- LEE, RAYMOND L., JAMES BURKHART, and VAN B. SHAW. *Contemporary Social Issues*. New York: Crowell. 1955. xv & 864 pp. \$3.95.
- LORIMER, FRANK. *Culture and Human Fertility: A Study of the Relation of Cultural Conditions to Fertility in Non-Industrial and Transitional Societies*. Paris: UNESCO (Distributed by Columbia University Press). 1954. 510 pp. \$4.75.
- LOWY, LOUIS, with foreword by Harleigh B. Trecker. *Adult Education and Group Work*. New York: White-side and William Morrow. 1955. 224 pp. \$4.
- MANDELBAUM, MAURICE. *The Phenomenology of Moral Experience*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. 1955. 338 pp. \$5.
- MEYERSON, MARTIN, and EDWARD C. BANFIELD. *Politics, Planning and the Public Interest: The Case of Public Housing in Chicago*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. 1955. 353 pp. \$5.
- MIERNYK, WILLIAM H., with the assistance of Nadine P. Rodwin. *Inter-Industry Labor Mobility: The Case of the Displaced Textile Worker*. Boston: Northeastern University Press. 1955. vii & 158 pp. \$2.75.
- NICHOLL, DONALD, and COLIN HARDIE, translators. *Dante's Monarchy and Three Political Letters*. [Library of Ideas.] New York: Noon-day Press. 1955. xxi & 121 pp. \$2.75.
- PARSONS, TALCOTT, and ROBERT F. BALES. *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. 1955. xvii & 422 pp. \$6.
- PASZKIEWICZ, HENRYK. *The Origin of Russia*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1954. xii & 356 pp. \$10.
- RANDALL, CLARENCE B. *A Foreign Economic Policy for the United States*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1954. vii & 83 pp. \$1.95.
- ROSTOW, W. W., in collaboration with Richard W. Hatch. *An American Policy in Asia*. New York: Technology Press of MIT, and John Wiley. 1955. ix & 59 pp. \$1.
- SHUBIK, MARTIN. *Readings in Game Theory and Political Behaviour*. [Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science.] Garden City: Doubleday. 1954. xiii & 74 pp. 95 cents.
- SOLO, ROBERT A., ed. *Economics and the Public Interest*. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press. 1955. xiv & 318 pp. \$5.75.
- TAFT, PHILIP. *The Structure and Government of Labor Unions*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1954. xi & 312 pp. \$6.
- THORELLI, HANS B. *The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradition*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1955. xvi & 658 pp. \$8.
- VANCE, RUPERT B., and NICHOLAS J. DEMERATH, eds., with the assistance of Sara Smith and Elizabeth M. Fink. *The Urban South*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina. 1954. xii & 307 pp. \$5.
- WALDO, DWIGHT. *The Study of Public Administration*. [Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science.] Garden City: Doubleday. 1955. xiii & 72 pp. 95 cents.
- WALLIS, WILSON D., and RUTH SAWTELL WALLIS. *The Micmac Indians of Eastern Canada*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1955. xv & 515 pp. \$7.50.
- WOODROW WILSON FOUNDATION and NATIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION. *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy: Its Concepts, Strategy and Limits*. New York: Henry Holt. 1955. xi & 414 pp. \$6.



THE GRADUATE FACULTY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

- REUBEN ABEL**—philosophy.
CHARLES ABRAMS (Visiting Professor)—housing, city planning, land economics.
RUDOLF ARNHEIM (Visiting Professor)—psychology, theory of art.
SOLOMON E. ASCH (Visiting Professor)—psychology.
MAX ASCOLI—legal and political philosophy.
HENRY G. AUBREY (Visiting Professor)—economics.
PAUL BOSCHAN (Visiting Professor)—applied economics.
ARNOLD BRECHT (Professor Emeritus)—political science, jurisprudence.
ARVID BRODERSEN—sociology.
DORION CAIRNS (Visiting Professor)—philosophy.
PIETRO CASTIGLIONI (Lecturer)—econometrics.
FELICIA J. DEYRUP (Secretary)—economics.
LACI FESSLER (Visiting Professor)—psychiatry and psychoanalysis.
KURT GOLDSTEIN (Visiting Professor)—neurology, psychiatry, psychology.
EMIL J. GUMBEL (Visiting Professor)—mathematical statistics.
EDUARD HEIMANN—economics.
MARY HENLE—psychology.
JULIUS HIRSCH (Visiting Professor)—business economics.
BARNA HORVATH (Visiting Professor)—theory of law, international law.
ERICH HULA—political science, constitutional and international law.
ALVIN JOHNSON (President Emeritus, New School for Social Research)—economics.
HANS JONAS—philosophy.
ALFRED KAHLER (Vice-Dean)—economics, statistics, labor problems.
HORACE M. KALLEN (Professor Emeritus)—philosophy, psychology.
OTTO KIRCHHEIMER—political science, constitutional law, criminology.
ERVAND KOGBETLIANTZ (Visiting Professor)—pure and applied mathematics, applied geophysics.
EUGEN KULLMANN (Visiting Professor)—philosophy.
HELEN BLOCK LEWIS (Visiting Professor)—psychology.
ADOLPH LOWE—economics.
JULIUS JOEL MANSON (Visiting Lecturer)—labor law.
ROBERT W. MARKS (Lecturer)—philosophy.
WERNER MARX—philosophy.
CARL MAYER—sociology.
ALEXANDER MELAMID—economic geography.
JULIE MEYER—labor problems.
FLORENCE R. MIALE (Lecturer)—psychology.
HANS NEISSER—economics.
PAUL NEURATH (Visiting Professor)—sociology, statistics.
SAUL K. PADOVER (Dean, School of Politics, New School for Social Research)—history and political science.
IRVIN ROCK—psychology.
ALBERT SALOMON—sociology.
RICHARD SCHULLER (Professor Emeritus)—economics.
ALFRED SCHUTZ—philosophy and sociology.
HANS SIMONS (President, New School for Social Research)—political science, international relations.
HANS W. SINGER (Visiting Professor)—economics.
HANS STAUDINGER (Dean)—economics, business administration.
ARTHUR L. SWIFT (Visiting Professor)—social psychology.
HANS WALLACH (Visiting Professor)—psychology.
HOWARD B. WHITE—political science.
FRIEDA WUNDERLICH (Professor Emeritus)—economics, labor problems.
JULIUS WYLER—applied statistics.
HAROLD E. YUKER (Visiting Professor)—psychology.

66 WEST TWELFTH STREET

NEW YORK 11, N. Y.

